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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellate Court No. 20000271 
Civil No. 990908206 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Supreme Court pursuant to its original 
appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j). Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann., § 78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Utah Court 
of Appeals for disposition. 
2. This appeal is from an Order of the Third Judicial District Court for the 
State of Utah, the Honorable Judge Sandra Peuler presiding, denying Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Appellee believes that Appellant's statement of issues on appeal are not 
correctly stated as Appellee believes that Appellant has incorrectly stated the 
standard of review. In addition, Appellant's failure to correctly state the standard of 
review has caused it to omit an issue of necessary consideration for this Court. 
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Consequently, Appellee will restate the issues according to the appropriate 
standards of review. 
1. Was the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed timely 
pursuant to the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.Civ.P.? Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons Co., Inc.. 817 P.2d 382 (Utah App. 1991); State of Utah, bv and 
through Utah State Department of Social Services v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1983). 
2. Did the Trial Court clearly abuse its discretion in ruling that Mr. Kearns 
failed to show that the default judgment against him was due to "excusable neglect"? 
The ruling of the District Court is entitled to considerable discretion and the 
Appellate Court is not to interfere with the broad discretion of the Trial Court absent 
a showing of clear abuse of that discretion. Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State 
Insurance Department. 991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 
(Utah 1986). 
3. Did the Trial Court clearly abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant 
failed to show he had a meritorious defense? The standard of review has been 
misstated by the Appellant. The latest statement of the standard on whether a Trial 
Court has correctly denied a motion to set aside a default judgment was stated by 
this Court in Black's Title. Inc. v. Utah State Insurance Department, 991 P.2d 607 
(Utah App. 1999). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the proper legal 
standard for determining whether a defense is meritorious is a question of law which 
00_40366 CEC wpd 2 
is reviewed for correctness (Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders. Inc.. 
882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994)). However, in subsequent cases, this particular 
correctness standard has been applied so the Trial Court's decision will not be 
interfered with unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of its considerable 
discretion. Black's Title, Inc.. 991 P.2d at 610; Katz. 732 P.2d at 93. Thus, the 
Appellant's statement that no deference is given to the trial judge's decision appears 
to be an erroneous statement of the standard of review with regard the determination 
of whether a meritorious defense exists. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.Civ.P.. provides, in pertinent part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may in 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, .surprise, or excusable 
neglect;.. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3) not more than three months after 
the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. 
Rule 58A, U.R.Civ.P.. states in pertinent part as follows: 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision 
(a) hereof, and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall 
be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation and register of actions and 
judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed 
entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real 
property, when the same is signed and filed as hereinabove 
provided. The Clerk shall immediately make a notation of the 
judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket. 
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Section 78-31 a-4, Utah Code Ann. 
(1) The Court, upon motion of any party showing the 
existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to 
arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning the existence of an 
arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters covered by the 
agreement, the court shall determine those issues and order or 
deny arbitration accordingly. 
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged 
arbitration agreement is involved in an action or proceeding 
pending before a court having jurisdiction to hear motions to 
compel arbitration, the motion shall be made to that court. 
Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with proper 
venue. 
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(A) Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal. Except in a first 
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a 
motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous 
or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include 
single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party. The Court may order that 
the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(B) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous 
appeal, motion, brief, or other papers one that is not grounded in 
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. An appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper inopposed for the purpose of delay 
is one inopposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, 
cause needless increase in the costs of litigation, or gain time 
that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief or 
other paper. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This matter concerns an appeal from the denial of the Defendant Michael J. 
Kearns' ("Kearns") Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment entered against him 
and in favor of Plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"). 
As in all cases reviewing a trial court's decision to refuse to set aside a default 
judgment, the issues concern whether (1) the defendant timely filed a motion to set 
aside the default judgment; (2) the defendant showed excusable neglect as required 
by Rule 60(b)(1); and, (3) if there was a sufficient showing of excusable neglect, 
whether the defendant demonstrated a meritorious defense. 
After full briefing by the parties concerning the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the complaint, Kearns' conduct after being served with the Complaint, 
the arguments regarding the alleged timeliness of the filing of his motion, his alleged 
excusable neglect, and his alleged meritorious defense, the Trial Court correctly 
determined that Kearns' motion was meritless and denied the Motion to Set Aside 
the Default Judgment leaving the Judgment in place. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On August 9,1999, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. filed a Complaint against 
Michael J. Kearns stemming from a dispute arising from a line of credit agreement 
entered into between Mr. Kearns and Wells Fargo Bank. The Complaint was served 
upon Mr. Kearns by substitute service on his wife, Miriam Kearns, on August 23, 
00_40366 CEC wpd 5 
1999. When no answer was filed, default pleadings were submitted to the Third 
Judicial District Court on September 13, 1999. On September 23, 1999, the 
Honorable Judge Peuler signed the Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant in the total amount of $272,390.03. After the entry of the Default 
Judgment, Wells Fargo Bank entered in a course of post-judgment collection 
proceedings, including the issuance of a Writ of Execution, Writs of Garnishment and 
a Motion and Order Supplemental Proceeding. On December 27, 1999, Michael 
Kearns filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. After the matter was fully 
briefed by the parties, Judge Peuler ruled by Minute Entry denying the Defendant's 
Motion. A final Order was entered by the Court on March 1, 2000, denying Michael 
Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. 
C. Disposition of Trial Court 
The Honorable Sandra N. Peuler denied Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the 
Default Judgment stating in her minute entry that the ruling was based upon the 
arguments raised and set forth in Wells Fargo's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Michael Kearns' Motion. A final Order was entered by Judge Peuler on March 1, 
2000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As Appellant did not set forth a statement of facts as required by Rule 
24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellee sets them forth as follows: 
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1. On January 28,1998, Defendant Michael J. Kearns ("Kearns") signed 
a Line of Credit Application securing a line of credit from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
("Wells Fargo") in the amount of $250,000.00. (R. 5-10). 
2. On or about February 13, 1998, Kearns used the line of credit by 
obtaining a cashier's check in the amount of $250,000.00. (R. 2, 140). 
3. Kearns made the required interest payments on the line of credit from 
June 1998 through December 1998 at which time Kearns ceased making payments. 
(R. 115). 
4. On or about August 9, 1999, Wells Fargo filed a Complaint against 
Kearns with the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake 
Department, to collect the outstanding loan. (R. 1-10). 
5. On August 23, 1999, Kearns was served with a Complaint through 
substitute service on Kearns' wife, Miriam C. Kearns at Kearns' principal residence. 
(R. 13-15). 
6. At the time of the service of the Complaint, Kearns was involved in 
separate litigation entitled In the Matter of the THOMAS F. KEARNS JR. and MARY 
DURKIN KEARNS Trust, in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, Case 
Number 993900489, before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick ("Thomas Kearns 
Trust Action"). (R. 116, 142-168). 
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7. Keams was represented by attorneys Eric C. Olson and Matthew K. 
Richards of the law firm of Kirton & McConkie in the Thomas Kearns Trust Action. 
(R. 116,142-168). 
8. On or about August 26,1999, three (3) days after being served with 
the subject Complaint, Kearns filed a Reply Memorandum in the Thomas Kearns 
Trust Action. (R. 142-155). (See. Addendum #1.) 
9. In the Reply Memorandum filed by Kearns in the Thomas Kearns Trust 
Action, it states that "Michael has been sued by the very entity that owes him a 
fiduciary duty". (R. 151) (See. Addendum # 1 at page 10.) 
10. In support of the Reply Memorandum filed in the Thomas Kearns Trust 
Action, Kearns filed a personal sworn Affidavit entitled "Second Affidavit of Michael 
J. Kearns". This was signed by Kearns on August 26, 1999 and subscribed and 
sworn in front of a notary public three (3) days after being served with the subject 
Complaint. (R. 157-167). (See. Addendum # 2.) 
11. In this Second Affidavit, Kearns states on August 26,1999, as follows: 
"On August 23, 1999,1 was served with a Summons and Complaint, dated August 
9, 1999, and attached hereto as Exhibit Q whereby the bank initiated litigation 
against me seeking payment of the entire loan amount, interest and litigation costs." 
(R. 166-167). (See. Addendum # 2, Page 10, paragraph 37.) 
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12. The Exhibit Q referenced in the Kearns Trust Action is the Wells Fargo 
complaint which initiated this action. (R. 117, fl 16; R 170-181). (See. Addendum 
#2.) 
13. On September 13, 1999, Wells Fargo submitted the subject Default 
Judgment with the Third Judicial District Court with accompanying documents. (R. 
16-21). 
14. On September 23,1999, (30 days after Kearns was served) the Default 
Judgment was signed by the Honorable Judge Sandra Peuler and filed by the Clerk 
of the Court. (R. 22-23). On September 27, 1999, the Default Judgment was 
entered in the registry of judgments. (R. 22). (See Addendum #3.) 
15. The Default Judgment was entered against Kearns and in favor of Wells 
Fargo in the sum of $266,351.85 with costs in the sum of $107.00, attorney's fees 
in the sum of $837.00, and interest in the sum of $5,094.18, fora total Judgment of 
$272,390.03. (R. 22-23). 
16. On September 29,1999, Wells Fargo, by and through its counsel, filed 
and mailed a Notice of Entry of Default Judgment to Kearns which was filed with the 
Court on October 1, 1999. (R. 26-27). This Notice identified the entry date of the 
judgment as September 23, 1999. 
17. On or about September 29,1999, Wells Fargo filed a Motion and Order 
in Supplemental Proceedings which was issued requiring Kearns to appear for 
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examination on October 26, 1999. The Order in Supplemental Proceedings was 
served on Kearns on October 6, 1999. (R. 44-46). 
18. On or about October 4,1999, Wells Fargo had issued multiple Writs of 
Garnishment, including a Writ of Continuing Wage Garnishment upon Kearns' own 
company, Michael J. Kearns dba Michael J. Kearns & Associates. This was served 
on the company on October 6, 1999. Neither Kearns nor his company ever 
responded to the Writ of Garnishment. (R. 50-55). 
19. On or about October 5, 1999, Wells Fargo had issued a Writ of 
Execution which was served upon Kearns or his wife on October 6, 1999. At the 
time of service, Kearns' 1986 Saab and 1996 Saab were towed and held pending 
an execution sale. (R. 38-39). 
20. On October 6 and 7,1999, Mark S. Swan, Wells Fargo's attorney, was 
contacted by Jerome Mooney, who represented himself to be Kearns' attorney, 
regarding a possible settlement of the subject claim. (R. 101-102). 
21. On October 19, 1999, Kearns sent correspondence to Richard M. 
Kovacevich, President of Wells Fargo & Company in which he stated: 
"That I owe this money has never been in question.. . . I have 
never stated anything to the contrary...." (R. 183-184). 
22. On October 22, 1999, Mark S. Swan prepared and mailed 
correspondence to Jerome Mooney informing him of Wells Fargo's intention to move 
forward with the Supplemental Order examination which was scheduled for October 
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26, 1999, due to the fact that Kearns had not responded to the garnishments, and 
the need to proceed forward with collection of the Judgment. (R. 102). 
23. On October 26, 1999, an attorney for Wells Fargo attended the 
Supplemental Order Examination. Neither Kearns nor his attorney, Jerry Mooney, 
attended the examination. (R. 102). 
24. On November 3, 1999, Mark S. Swan had another telephone 
conversation with Jerry Mooney regarding possible settlement of this matter. (R. 
102). 
25. On November 5,1999, Mark S. Swan sent correspondence to Jerome 
Mooney regarding the possible settlement of the matter and the need to settle this 
matter quickly because of the accruing interest and the storage fees which were 
increasing daily on the two Saabs being held under the Writ of Execution. (R. 102). 
26. On or about November 9,1999, Mark S. Swan sent correspondence to 
Jerome Mooney withdrawing the unilateral forbearance from collection due to 
Kearns' misrepresentations, and Wells Fargo served a Writ of Non-Wage 
Garnishment (Post-Judgment) upon Donald J. Showalter, Trust Manager for Wells 
Fargo Bank, Private Client Services, and successfully seized an amount sufficient 
to pay the judgment in full. (R. 102). 
27. On November 9, 1999, Jerome Mooney sent responding 
correspondence to Mark S. Swan indicating that Kearns would pay off the judgment 
before November 22, 1999. (R. 102). 
00_40366 CEC wpd 11 
28. On or about December 2,1999, Kearns delivered to Wells Fargo a Bank 
One Official Check in the amount of $282,325.08, satisfying the full judgment against 
him. (R. 120). 
29. On December 8,1999, Wells Fargo filed a Satisfaction of Judgment with 
this Court and released the Garnishment. (R. 73-74). 
30. On Monday, December 27,1999, Kearns filed this Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment. (R. 77-80). 
31. In Support of Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Kearns 
filed his own Affidavit and an Affidavit of his wife, Miriam C. Kearns. (R. 95-100). 
(See, Addendum # 4.) 
32. After Kearns' Memorandum in Support, Wells Fargo's Memorandum in 
Opposition and Kearns' Reply Memorandum, and the Motion were duly submitted 
to the Court, the Honorable Judge Sandra N. Peuler ruled pursuant to a minute entry 
on January 31,2000, that Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was not 
well taken. (R. 207-208). 
33. On March 1, 2000, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Third Judicial 
District Court Judge, signed the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment, which was filed with the Court on March 2, 2000. (R. 241-243). 
34. On March 28, 2000, Kearns filed a Notice of Appeal of the Order 
Denying Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. (R. 244-246). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court should uphold the decision of the Trial Court by finding it did not 
clearly abuse its considerable discretion in denying Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the 
Default Judgment. The Motion to Set Aside was filed three (3) days late. There are 
sufficient facts and circumstances to show that the default judgment resulted from 
Kearns' lack of due diligence and due to Kearns' inexcusable neglect. Even if 
Kearns exercised due diligence and had excusable neglect, the Trial Court did not 
clearly abuse its discretion in denying Kearns' motion due to the lack of a meritorious 
defense. Kearns has continuously admitted owing the obligation, and therefore, 
there is no meritorious defense. 
Lastly, there are sufficient other grounds for this Court to uphold the Trial 
Court's decision and find that there was not a clear abuse of the Trial Court's broad 
discretion. 
After review of the facts and circumstances surrounding this appeal, this Court 
should affirm the Trial Court's decision and grant Wells Fargo damages against 
Kearns or Kearns' attorney pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
00_40366 CEC wpd 13 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS FILED 
MORE THAN THREE MONTHS AFTER THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED. 
It appears from numerous appellate decisions in this state that the first inquiry 
regarding a Rule 60(b)(1) motion is whether the motion was timely filed. Black's 
Title, 991 P.2d at 610; Richins. 817 P.2d at 387; and Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1055-
56. While this does not appear to be the basis of the Trial Court's ruling, this is an 
important issue for this Court to consider. Since the dates are without dispute, it 
would appear that the application of the timing rule contained in Rule 60(b), as that 
is defined by Rule 58A, would be a question of easy determination and result in 
summary disposition of this matter. 
It is without dispute that the Default Judgment in this case was signed on 
September 23, 1999, and was stamped "Filed District Court Third Judicial District 
September 23, 1999, by K. Grotepas, Deputy Clerk"' on its face. (R. 22-23). (See, 
Addendum # 3.) It is also without dispute that this same Default Judgment was 
entered in the Registry of Judgments on September 27,1999. (R. 22). (Addendum 
#3.) It is without dispute that Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was 
filed with the Third District Court on December 27, 1999, at 4:22 p.m. (R. 77-80). 
Thus, Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment can only be considered 
timely if the 3-month time period begins running from September 27,1999, the date 
of entry into the Registry of Judgments. If the time period began running on 
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September 23,1999, then the Kearns' Motion was untimely. An untimely motion to 
set aside default judgment is a fatal defect, which renders other inquiries under Rule 
60(b) moot. M.L.v.V.H.. 894 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Rule 60(b) states that "the motion shall be made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than three months after the judgment, order or 
proceeding was entered or taken." (emphasis added). Wells Fargo believes that 
the phrase "entered or taken" in Rule 60(b), must be defined and construed in 
connection with the language of Rule 58A(b) and (c). Rule 58A states as follows: 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in 
Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all 
judgments shall be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. 
(emphasis added) 
(c) When judgment entered; notation and register of actions 
and judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be 
deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of lien on 
real property, when the same is signed and filed as 
hereinabove provided. The clerk shall immediately make a 
notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the 
judgment docket, (emphasis added) 
The language of Rule 58A says "filed with the Clerk," not "filed by the Clerk". 
That language would indicate that once the Judge signs the Judgment and gives it 
to the court clerk (i.e. files it) that it is a final judgment regardless of when it is 
entered in the register of actions and the judgment docket. In this case it is without 
dispute that the Judgment was signed by the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Third 
Judicial District Court Judge, on September 23,1999. It is also without question that 
it was filed with the Clerk of the Court on September 23, 1999. (See. Court stamp 
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on Addendum # 3.) Consequently, the term "entered" in Rule 60(b) is defined by 
Rule 58A(b) and (c). Since a judgment is entered when it is signed and filed "with 
the clerk" then it should be without dispute that the judgment in this case was 
"entered" on September 23,1999. The use of September 27,1999, the date when 
Judgment was filed in the Judgment Register is not the date of entry for Rule 60(b) 
purposes. 
Kearns filed his Motion to Set Aside on Monday, December 27,1999, more 
than three months after the judgment was "entered". To be timely, it should have 
been filed by Friday, December 24,1999. As it was untimely, it should have been 
denied by the Trial Court on that basis alone. Kearns was specifically informed of 
the date of the entry of the Judgment pursuant to a Notice of Entry of Default 
Judgment filed on behalf of Wells Fargo, which was mailed to Kearns on September 
30,1999. (R. 26-27). Not only did Kearns have actual notice, but his counsel, once 
involved in this matter on October 7, 1999 (R. 102), had a personal obligation to 
check with the Clerk of the Court as to the date of entry. See. Automatic Control 
Products Corp. v. Tel-Tech. Inc.. 780 P.2d 1258,1260 (Utah 1989). Thus, there can 
be no argument that his attorney did not have notice and sufficient time to file the 
motion in a timely manner. 
Thus, this Court should determine that the Motion to Set Aside the Default 
Judgment was without merit because it was untimely. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT KEARNS' FAILURE 
TO ANSWER THE COMPLAINT WAS NOT DUE TO EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. 
Kearns claims that the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing the vacate 
the Judgment because Kearns alleges that he had sufficient "excusable neglect" to 
meet the standards under Rule 60(b)(1) to set aside the default judgment. 
Unfortunately in support of his argument, Kearns skews the law by only quoting 
language that talks about the policy of allowing a party to have his day in court. 
What Kearns does not do is appropriately cite to this Court any of the cases defining 
the balancing that is to be used in finding "excusable neglect" and how that term is 
defined and applied in specific circumstances. When these cases are reviewed and 
applied, it is clear that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
Kearns' neglect was not excusable under the specific facts of this case. 
The policy considerations set forth by Kearns are not nearly as one-sided as 
they appear from his brief. In discussing these policy considerations, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Airkem Intermountain v. Parker. 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 
(1973), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
For this court to overturn the discretion of the lower court in 
refusing to vacate a valid judgment, the requirements of public 
policy demand more than a mere statement than a person did 
not have his day in court when full opportunity for a hearing 
was afforded to him or his representative. The movant must 
show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented 
from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control, 
id- 431 (emphasis in bold added). 
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See also. Black's Title. Inc.. 991 P.2d at 611. 
This excusable neglect standard has also been described as the "exercise of 
'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini 
Spas. Inc. v. Industrial Commission. 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987). See also. 
Meadow Fresh Farms. Inc. v. Utah State University Department of Agriculture and 
Applied Science. 813 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991). 
Kearns was never prevented from appearing. Rather than showing "due 
diligence", the facts show that Kearns made a conscious decision to not answer the 
Complaint and knowingly accepted the consequences. 
Kearns was served with the Complaint on August 23, 1999, through 
substitute service on Kearns' wife. The Complaint stemmed from Kearns' failure to 
make the minimum interest payments on a $250,000.00 line of credit with Wells 
Fargo and subsequent refusal to pay the full amount of the loan after acceleration. 
Kearns claims in paragraph 3 of his Affidavit that "[d]ue to my wife's preoccupation 
with sustaining my son's life, she neglected to bring the Complaint to my attention 
for several days" (emphasis added) (Addendum #4). Kearns states in paragraph 
4 of his Affidavit that "[o]nce Mrs. Kearns alerted me to the Complaint, I failed to file 
an answer or bring it to my attorney's attention due to my own preoccupation with 
my son's condition" (emphasis added) (Addendum #2). Apparently these "facts" are 
supposed to show that Kearns did not give the Complaint to his attorney before the 
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default was entered. These alleged "facts" are the only sworn statements given by 
Kearns to support his claim of excusable neglect. 
Assuming that Kearns' son was in fact ill, it is clear that this had nothing to do 
with Kearns' ability to timely answer the Complaint1. Kearns' wife did not wait 
"several days" before giving the subject Complaint to Kearns. On August 26,1999, 
Kearns filed the Second Affidavit of Michael J. Kearns in the Thomas Kearns Trust 
Action (Addendum #2). This Affidavit was filed three days after the subject 
Complaint was served on Kearns' wife. Kearns stated in the Second Affidavit 
that: 
"On August 23, 1999, I was served with a summons and complaint, 
dated August 9, 1999, and attached hereto as Exhibit Q, whereby the 
Bank initiated litigation against me seeking payment of the entire loan 
amount, interest, and litigation costs." 
Because Kearns refers to the Complaint in his Affidavit and attaches it as an exhibit 
on August 26,1999, Kearns' statement that his wife failed to give him the Complaint 
for "several days" must mean three days or less. 
Additionally, Kearns' sworn statement that he failed to bring the Complaint to 
his attorney's attention due to his preoccupation with his son's condition is false. In 
the Thomas Kearns Trust Action, Kearns was represented by Eric C. Olson and 
Matthew K. Richards of the law firm of Kirton & McConkie. Kearns' attorneys filed 
1
 Even if Kearns' son was ill, inconvenience or press of personal or 
business affairs does not constitute excusable neglect. Valley Leasing v. Houghton, 
661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983), nor does even personal illness, Warren v. Dixon Ranch 
Co.. 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1983). 
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a Reply Memorandum in the Thomas Kearns Trust Action on August 26,1999, 
three days after the service of the subject Complaint. On page 10 of the Reply 
Memorandum, Kearns' attorneys stated that: 
". . .[OJnce Michael followed through with his threats to seek a new 
trustee, collection efforts began and Michael now has been sued by 
the very entity that owes him a fiduciary duty." 
Thus, Kearns not only informed his attorneys of the subject Complaint, he supplied 
his attorneys with the Complaint, and his attorneys used the subject Complaint as 
an exhibit in the Thomas Kearns Trust Action only three days after it was served 
on Kearns' wife. Thus, Kearns' attorneys had at least until September 23,1999, (the 
date of the Default Judgment) to answer the Complaint, or 28 days from the date it 
was used by Kearns and his attorneys in the Thomas Kearns Trust Action. Kearns 
and his attorneys' failure to timely answer was not the result of "excusable neglect." 
The excuse that Kearns offers to support his claim of "excusable neglect" and 
to pass that test that he used the due diligence of an ordinary person in responding 
to the complaint was that he was "preoccupied" with his son's illness. However, this 
statement is insufficient to establish excusable neglect. The effect of illness in 
demonstrating "excusable neglect" has been reviewed several times by Utah courts. 
The most recent application of the illness claim is as follows: 
Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[ijllness 
alone is not sufficient to make neglect in defending one's aclions 
excusable." Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416,420-21, 
260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953). A movant seeking relief may not 
simply rest on the assertion that he was ill to excuse his 
inactions; he must show that the nature of the illness 
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incapacitated him such that he was unable to act. See, Id. at 
743 (We are not told the nature of the illness and it does not 
appear that the appellant. . .was so incapacitated the he could 
not have called an attorney to have his rights and the rights of 
the corporation protected"). Here, Black merely asserted that he 
was under a doctor's care and unable to work. He neither 
described the illness, nor explained how it wholly prevented 
him from taking the steps required to remain in contact with 
counsel, Black's Title or the Department. In the absence of 
such showing, Black's assertion does not demonstrate his 
neglect was excusable, (emphasis added). 
Black's Title. 991 P.2d at 611. There are no facts that show that the illness of 
Kearns' son was of such an extensive nature that it "incapacitated" Kearns such that 
he was unable to act and that it "wholly prevented him" from responding to the 
Complaint. In fact, it is quite clear that the illness did not prevent Kearns from using 
the Complaint and communicate with his attorney in another court action. An 
answer to the subject Complaint, would presumably have been a simple pleading, 
such as a general denial, if Kearns claimed he did not owe the money (even though 
he has always admitted that the owed the money). 
Based upon the above, Kearns is clearly attempting to mislead this Court. 
Kearns' failure to answer the subject Complaint was not caused by excusable 
neglect, but appears to be the result of a conscious decision not to answer, or 
through pure indifference on the part of Kearns2. Kearns did not use due diligence 
after receiving the subject Complaint and was not incapacitated or wholly prevented 
This Court can conclude, based upon the facts, that Kearns's failure to 
respond to the Complaint was a deliberate choice. Board of Education of Granite 
School District v. Cox. 384 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1963). 
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from answering the Complaint by circumstances which were outside his control. In 
fact, Kearns was in total control of the circumstances. Therefore, Kearns' Motion to 
Set Aside Default Judgment must was correctly denied. 
POINT III 
KEARNS DOES NOT HAVE A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE. 
The first inquiries on a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a default judgment are 
whether the motion is timely filed and whether there has been sufficient excusable 
neglect. Black's Title, id- at 610. Only after those two thresholds are resolved in 
favor of the movant, does the issue of meritorious defense arise. If Kearns cannot 
persuade this Court that the Trial Court clearly abused its discretion with regard to 
the first two levels of inquiry, then the issue of meritorious defense is not even 
considered. Thus, a movant may have a meritorious defense, but if he fails the 
timeliness or the excusable neglect standards, the movant will not be entitled to 
relief. See. State of Utah by and through Utah State Dept. of Social Services v. 
Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983); Classic Cabinets. Inc. v. All 
American Life Insurance Co.. 978 P.2d 465, 470, fn 5 (Utah App. 1999); Miller v. 
Brocksmith. 825 P.2d 690, 693-94 (Utah App. 1992); Board of Education of Granite 
School Dist. V. Cox. 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 (1963). Kearns has not been 
able to demonstrate the initial threshold elements necessary to set aside the Default 
Judgment and the Trial Court's decision should be affirmed. 
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Notwithstanding these initial elements, Kearns cannot satisfy the final element 
as he has not set forth a meritorious defense. The single greatest reason why 
Kearns cannot set forth a meritorious defense is that he has admitted to the debt 
owed to Wells Fargo and has never disputed his obligation to Wells Fargo. Kearns 
has never filed a proposed answer. The filing of a proposed answer appears to be 
a requirement in setting forth a meritorious defense. See, Erickson v. Schenkers 
International Forwarders. Inc.. 882 P.2d 1147, 1149-50 (Utah 1994); and 
i 
Musselman. ]d. at 1058. Thus, without a proposed answer before it and with the fact 
that Kearns has never denied liability and in fact has admitted liability subsequent 
to the filing of the Complaint, the Trial Court correctly determined that there was no 
meritorious defense. The purpose of the meritorious defense rule is to "prevent the 
necessity of judicial review of questions, which, on the face of the pleadings are 
frivolous." Musselman. 667 P.2d at 1060; see also. Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149. 
The defenses raised by Kearns in both his brief before this Court and before the Trial 
Court do not raise a meritorious defense to the underlying claim of liability. 
A. Kearns' claim that the Complaint should have been 
adjudicated in arbitration is not a meritorious defense. 
Kearns correctly sets forth the language regarding arbitration. However, 
Kearns fails to discuss the specific language of that paragraph and its application in 
the present context. Upon review and application of this language, it is clear that the 
arbitration paragraph does not give rise to a meritorious defense in and of itself. 
The pertinent language of the paragraph is as follows: 
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You agree that any Dispute not resolved informally, regardless 
of when it arose, will be settled in accordance with the terms of 
the Arbitration Program at the election of any party.. .A party 
to a Dispute may by summary proceeding bring any action in 
court to compel arbitration of any Dispute. 
It is undisputed that Keams did not timely "elect" to have the dispute between 
the parties arbitrated. The option of arbitration was first raised in Keams' Motion to 
Set Aside the Default Judgment. The arbitration agreement does not prohibit Wells 
Fargo from filing a lawsuit against Kearns. What the contract provides is an 
opportunity for Kearns to elect arbitration if he chooses once a lawsuit is filed against 
him. If he allows a judgment to be entered before he elects arbitration, than that 
right is waived. Kearns should not be able to demand arbitration now, especially 
since he admits the debt and has paid the Judgment. This is consistent with the 
Utah Arbitration Act, § 78-31 a-4, which gives a party an option to motion a court to 
compel the parties to arbitrate if there is an arbitration agreement. 
The only issue that was entitled to be tried was whether Kearns owed an 
obligation to Wells Fargo. Since the obligation is admitted by Keams, the argument 
made by Kearns to have the judgment set aside violates the policy of the meritorious 
defense rule, which is to avoid judicial review of questions and pleadings which are 
without merit or frivolous. See. Erickson. 882 P.2d at 1149 and Musselman. 667 
P.2dat1060. 
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B. The award of attorney's fees in the Judgment and the 
potential existence for a Counterclaim do not establish a 
meritorious defense. 
Kearns argues that somehow he was prejudiced by Wells Fargo being 
awarded attorney's fees and costs. However, this is not an issue that raises a 
meritorious defense. The fees awarded in the Judgment were the total of $837.00 
(R. 23), which was set forth in the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees (R. 17-21). The fees 
would certainly have been greater based upon the standard fee schedule of the 
American Arbitration Association as the filing fee to initiate an arbitration with a panel 
of three arbitrators is more than the fee awarded by the Court. Further, it is clear 
that since Kearns admits the debt that attorney's fees and costs would have been 
awarded regardless. Thus, this issue of attorney's fees does not establish a 
"meritorious defense" to the question of liability. 
Kearns' claim that he has potential lender liability claims against Wells Fargo 
which could offset the undisputed obligation is also not sufficient to set forth a 
meritorious defense. Kearns has never filed a proposed counterclaim or any 
document that would identify the nature and extent of the alleged lender liability 
claims. In fact, the term "lender liability claims" was used for the first time in Kearns' 
Reply Brief in support of his Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. (R. 194-204). 
A claim or defense described no better than "lender liability claims" cannot be 
deemed to raise a meritorious defense because it alleges no facts pursuant to which 
a court can fulfill its obligations to review the proposed answer and determine as a 
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matter of law whether it contains a defense which is entitled to be tried. Musselman. 
667 P.2d at 1058, Erickson. 882 P.2d at 1148-49. 
Therefore, Kearns' original Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was 
justifiably denied by the Trial Court even if Kearns could appropriately show the 
motion was filed in a timely manner and that there was sufficient excusable neglect. 
There have been no meritorious defenses presented to the obligations owed to 
Weils Fargo, particularly in light of Mr. Kearns' repeated admission that he "has 
never refuted that he owed Wells Fargo $250,000.00 plus interest". (See. 
Appellant's Brief at page 15). Consequently, the trial court's decision denying the 
Kearns' Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
A BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES OF THIS CASE CLEARLY SHOW THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN 
DENYING KEARNS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
As stated previously, this Court is only to reverse the Trial Court if it clearly 
abused its broad discretion in refusing to set aside the Default Judgment. Black's 
Title. Inc.. 991 P.2d 607 at 610. The application of this rule is on a case by case 
basis as noted by the Utah Supreme Court: 
The trial court has broad discretion to balance the equities on a 
case-by-case basis, including such considerations as the 
preference to allow the presentation of all claims and defenses, 
any delay or unfairness of a party's conduct, the need for finality 
of judgments, and the respective hardships in denying or 
granting relief. See, Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 
260 P.2d 471 (1953); Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 
1981); Airkem Intermountain v. Parker, supra. 
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Kate, 732 P.2d at 96 (fn 2). 
There is a particular need for the Court to balance the equities of this case. 
First of all, Kearns' admission of the debt seems to indicate that there is no equitable 
reason for the judgment to be set aside and to cause both parties to incur additional 
attorney's fees and waste judicial resources. There is also the fact that this debt and 
Judgment was paid by Kearns within the three-month time period to file the Motion 
to Set Aside the Default Judgment, and as a result, Kearns received a Satisfaction 
of Judgment. This fact creates an additional factor for consideration by the Court. 
In Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Ass'n, Inc.. 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
. . . both the six-month delay and the fact of prior satisfaction show 
that the motion was not made within a reasonable time. While we 
decline plaintiffs' invitation to go so far as to say that a judgment once 
knowingly and voluntarily satisfied becomes extinguished and is 
therefore never subject to modification, see Mitchell v. Lindlv. Okl., 351 
P.2d 1063 (1960), we do consider the fact of prior satisfaction an 
important consideration in determining whether the moti«*r» to 
modify was made within a reasonable time. The possibility of 
prejudice to the nonmoving party increases significantly when the 
judgment has already been paid, (emphasis added) 
The following chronology of events shows that Kearns consciously decided 
to allow the judgment to stand and post-judgment collection efforts to proceed 
forward. Kearns had multiple opportunities to timely object to the Default Judgment. 
Kearns' actions show a pattern of waiver and laches, and thus Kearns should not 
now be allowed to reopen a case that is now closed, particularly when he voluntarily 
00_40366 CEC wpd 27 
paid the judgment to receive a Satisfaction of Judgment and a Release of 
Garnishment. 
1. After obtaining the default judgment, Wells Fargo filed Motion and Order 
in Supplemental Proceedings on September 29, 1999. The Order required the 
Kearns to appear on October 26, 1999. The Order was served on Kearns on 
October 6, 1999. 
2. On October 4, 1999, Wells Fargo caused Writs of Garnishment to be 
issued, one of which was on Kearns' company, Michael J. Kearns dba Michael J. 
Kearns & Associates. This garnishee, controlled by Kearns, never responded to the 
garnishment. 
3. Wells Fargo caused to be issued a Writ of Execution on October 5, 
1999, which was served on October 6,1999. At this time both of Kearns' vehicles, 
a 1986 Saab and a 1996 Saab, were towed and held pending an execution sale. 
Kearns never requested a hearing or filed an objection to the seizure. 
4. On October 7, 1999, Mark S. Swan, attorney for Wells Fargo, was 
contacted by Jerry Mooney, Kearns' attorney, regarding a possible settlement of the 
subject claim. Mr. Swan was amenable to settlement of the matter and waited for 
Mr. Mooney to get back to him regarding settlement. 
5. On October 19, 1999, Kearns sent correspondence to Richard M. 
Kovacevich, President of Wells Fargo & Company in which he stated, "That I owe 
this money has never been in question. . . . I have never stated anything to the 
contrary. . . . " 
6. On October 21, 1999, Mark S. Swan prepared and mailed 
correspondence to Jerry Mooney informing him of Wells Fargo's intention to move 
forward with the Supplemental Order Examination which was scheduled for October 
26, 1999, due to the fact that Kearns' company had not responded to the 
garnishments, and the need to proceed forward with judgment collection. Mr. Swan 
sent this correspondence because of the fact that settlement negotiations were not 
moving forward. 
7. On October 26, 1999, Wells Fargo's attorneys attended the 
Supplemental Order Examination. Neither Kearns nor any of his attorneys attended 
the hearing. 
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8. On November 2, 1999, a Bench Warrant was issued against Kearns 
because of his violation of the Court Order requiring him to appear for a 
supplemental examination. 
9. On November 3, 1999, Mark S. Swan had another telephone 
conversation with Jerry Mooney regarding possible settlement of this matter. 
10. On November 5,1999, Mark S. Swan sent correspondence to Jerome 
Mooney regarding the possible settlement of the matter and the need to settle this 
matter quickly because of the interest and storage fees which were increasing daily 
on the two Saabs which were being held pursuant to the execution. 
11. On November 9,1999, Mark S. Swan sent correspondence to Jerome 
Mooney withdrawing the unilateral forbearance from collection due to Kearns' 
misrepresentations, and Wells Fargo caused a Writ of Garnishment to be served on 
the Trust Department of Wells Fargo Bank and successfully seized an amount 
sufficient to pay the judgment in full. Kearns did not file an objection to the 
garnishment. 
12. On November 9, 1999, Jerome Mooney sent responding 
correspondence to Mark S. Swan indicating that Kearns would pay off the judgment 
before November 22, 1999. 
13. On or about December 2,1999, Kearns-delivered to Wells Fargo a Bank 
One Officiai Check in the amount of $282,325.08, satisfying the full judgment against 
him. 
14. On December 8,1999, Wells Fargo filed a Satisfaction of Judgment with 
this Court and submitted a Release of Garnishment to the necessary entities. 
Obviously, Kearns and his attorneys allowed the judgment collection process 
to go forward without ever attempting to timely set aside the Default Judgment, 
despite multiple opportunities to demand hearings in the post-judgment collection 
proceedings. Kearns refused to participate in any of the post-judgment collection 
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proceedings. While Mr. Mooney has been representing Kearns in this matter3 at 
least since October 7,1999, the Motion to Set Aside was his first formal appearance 
in this case. Only after the judgment was voluntarily paid, and Wells Fargo filed a 
Satisfaction of Judgment with this Court, did Kearns belatedly file the Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment. Wells Fargo was forced to go to considerable time and 
expense in collecting the underlying debt before it was voluntarily paid. Therefore, 
Kearns' delay in filing the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and the fact of prior 
satisfaction show that the Motion was not filed within a reasonable time and the 
attorney's fees Wells Fargo is now paying after the judgment was satisfied creates 
a substantial prejudice to it created solely by Kearns' tactics. Kearns' actions 
constitute waiver and/or laches thereby equitably estopping Kearns from having the 
Judgment set aside. 
These factors coupled with the deemed admission by Kearns of the obligation 
and the possibility of prejudice to Wells Fargo since the Judgment has already been 
paid, are additional grounds upon which this Court can uphold the Trial Court's 
decision. It is well established law in the state of Utah that this Court should affirm 
the decision of the Trial Court if it can do so on any ground. See. Matter of Estate 
Messrs. Larsen and Mooney represented Kearns before and at the time 
the subject Complaint was served as they were representing Kearns in another case 
pending before the Third Judicial District Court, Michael J. Kearns v. Richard Howa. 
Harry Rosenthal and Connie Mallet. Case No. 990904000, filed April 13, 1999, 
before Judge Noel, which case is still pending. (R. 127). Thus, at the time of service, 
Kearns had two law firms working for him. 
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ofSheplev. 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 
1980). Thus, Wells Fargo would request this Court to find that there are sufficient 
equitable grounds in addition to legal grounds to uphold the Trial Court's decision to 
deny the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment and thereby affirm the Trial 
Court's decision in allowing the Default Judgment to stand. 
POINT V 
KEARNS' AFFIDAVIT IS FRIVOLOUS, AND THEREFORE WELLS FARGO 
SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
Pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, if this Court 
determines that Kearns' appeal is either frivolous or for delay, it may award just 
damages that may include single or double costs and/or reasonable attorney's fees 
to Wells Fargo. This Court has the option of ordering that the damages be paid by 
Kearns or Kearns' attorney. The standard for frivolous appeal does not require a 
finding of bad faith. O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A frivolous 
appeal is one that has no reasonable legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd. 
Partnership v.Hall. 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Maughan v. Mauqhan. 770 
P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). A frivolous appeal also has been defined as "[o]ne 
in which no justiciable question has been presented and. . .is readily recognizable 
as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed". Hunt v. 
Hurst. 785 P.2d 414,416 (Utah 1990); see also, Farrel) v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299,302 
(Utah App. 1992). 
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Kearns' claim that he has satisfied the requirements of Rule 60(b) is full of 
conclusory statements and platitudes with no substantive factual basis. As such, 
both his motion before the trial court and his current appeal are totally absent of the 
facts and law necessary to show the requisite elements necessary to obtain relief 
under Rule 60(b)(1). It does not appear that the arguments raised by Kearns are 
grounded in material fact or warranted by existing law. In fact, Wells Fargo believes 
that Kearns is trying to manipulate the general policy of allowing a litigant to have his 
day in court by how he describes this case. With the facts that Kearns has 
personally admitted the debt, his attorney has acknowledged the debt subsequent 
to the Judgment, and Kearns has voluntarily paid the Judgment, there is a clear 
indication that there was no proper motivation for filing the original motion or this 
appeal. This is especially true since Kearns' appeal is a restatement of his argument 
before the Trial Court. The issue was so clear to the Trial Court that no oral 
argument was needed. Kearns' actions are causing an unnecessary expense to 
Wells Fargo which obtained a valid judgment on an acknowledged debt and which 
has no way to obtain recompense for its attorney's fees, absent this court awarding 
such fees and costs pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This 
case seems to be close to the situation decried by the Utah Supreme Court in DeBrv 
v. Cascade Enterprises. 935 P.2d 499, 502-03 (Utah 1997). Thus, Wells Fargo 
requests this Court to find that the appeal is frivolous and not warranted in law and 
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award Wells Fargo double its costs and reasonable compensation for the time and 
labor expended by its attorneys in defending the appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated above, the Trial Court correctly used its broad discretion in 
denying Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment as Kearns' motion did not 
meet the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.Civ.P. Kearns did not file the Rule 
60(b)(1) motion within three (3) months of the default judgment being entered by the 
Court. Kearns' actions post-judgment, even if the motion were filed timely, were 
such that it would be inequitable and not meet the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1) to 
set aside the Default Judgment. The facts show that Kearns did not fail to answer 
the Complaint due to excusable neglect. 
Despite Kearns' statements that he was "preoccupied" with his son's illness 
and did not receive the Complaint for "several days" from his wife, the facts are clear 
and undisputed that he was aware of the Complaint and turned the Complaint over 
to his attorneys who used it in another case within three days of Kearns' wife being 
served. Thus, there was ample opportunity for Kearns and his team of attorneys to 
answer a simple collection complaint. Furthermore, in light of Kearns' continual 
admission that he owed the obligation to Wells Fargo, his arguments regarding 
having a meritorious defense are meaningless. In light of the factors set forth above, 
it would appear that this is a frivolous appeal within the definition of Rule 33, Utah 
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Rules of Appellate Procedure entitling Wells Fargo to double its costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
Wherefore, Wells Fargo respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Trial 
Court's decision and find that the Trial Court did not abuse its broad discretion in 
determining that there was no reason to set aside the Default Judgment. Wells 
Fargo also requests that it be awarded its costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 
33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this / 7 / d a y of July, 2000. 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
M/rk $. Swan 
Attom'e^y for Wells Fargo/Appellee 
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hereby certify that on the /7 day of July, 2000,1 caused two (2) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same 
in the United States rnail, postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Mark A. Larsen 
joleen S. Mantas 
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ADDENDUM #1 
Eric C. Olson (#4108) 
Matthew K. Richards (#7972) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Michael J. Keams 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. PROBATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
THE THOMAS F. KEARNS, JR. and : SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S 
MARY DURKIN KEARNS TRUST, : MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
: JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION 
TO WELLS FARGO'S MOTION FOR 
: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: Case No 993900489 TR 
: Judge J Dennis Frederick 
Petitioner. Michael J. Kearns ("Michael"), through counsel, submits the following Reply 
Memorandum in support of his Motion for Summar. Judgment and in opposition to the Motion 
for Summar. Judgment filed by Wells Fargo Bank (hereinafter "Wells Fargo " or "'the Bank"). 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Counsel paints the Bank's dealings with Michael with benign colors Of course, that is 
what good advocates are supposed to do for their clients However, protestations of disinterest 
do not disguise the very real conflicts existing between Michael and the Bank Because the 
$&L 
6Y. 
' — . i £ 
•c?yry 
A 
W 
Bank persists in claiming a "right" as a matter of law to remain as trustee and essentially do as it 
pleases under the guise of "fiduciary duty," Michael has provided a second affidavit setting forth 
in greater detail the Bank's conflicts and deficiencies. The issue here is not whether this trustee 
can come up with a plausible explanation for conduct at variance with the interests and desires of 
the primary beneficiary, but whether this Court should embrace such explanations as sufficient 
excuse for the perpetuation of a failed and suspect trustee relationship. 
It must be remembered that Michael fought a long and expensive battle to keep some 
portion of the Trust's Kearns Tribune stock intact. Now the Bank, in the name of its "rights" as 
trustee, wants to pursue a course calculated to undermine that victory. At the same time, 
Michael's mother ("PiersoF) refuses to permit a dissolution of the Trust that would allow 
Michael direct control of the assets he has preserved. With the Bank now openly hostile to 
Michael because of nonpayment of a loan made to him solely because of his status as beneficiary 
of the Trust, among other reasons, the Court should terminate Wells Fargo as trustee and appoint 
a different institutional trustee. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE 
The Bank disputes five of Michael's material undisputed facts but then offers several 
"facts" of its own that, by reason of their generality and incomplete nature, must be disputed: 
The Facts Disputed By The Bank 
*\m 13, 15 of Petitioner's Memo—This quarrel is entirely semantic. The Bank has never 
been willing to admit the simple fact that it followed Michael's investment advice for nearly 
eighteen months with singular success. Yet, however it may choose to garnish the reality with 
references to "independent judgment and discretion," the four-fold increase in the value of the 
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Trust assets between September, 1997 and June, 1999 rests exclusively on Wells Fargo's 
willingness to rely on Michael's judgment. Conversely, the most glaring losses and lost 
opportunities in connection with the Trust are those instances in which the Bank disregarded 
Michael's wishes in its ill-advised attempt to demonstrate independence. 
This point, of course, lay at the heart of the disagreement over the form of affidavit 
sought in the Piersol litigation. In the affidavit, the Bank insisted on characterizing its handling 
of the Trust in terms that dismissed Michael's input as inconsequential which is simply not so. 
In refusing to give Michael his due as the one demanding a course for the Trust that proved 
extraordinarily beneficial the Bank undercut his position in the Piersol dispute. 
*F 16 of Petitioner's Memo—This rationalization by the Bank is predictable but ultimately 
incomprehensible. After nearly 1.5 year's success in holding the Trust asset per Michael's 
request and despite the recent receipt of AT&T stock that was both blue chip and produced 
dividends, the Bank felt compelled earlier this year to implement its discredited diversification 
scheme at a time when those with knowledge of the market recognized AT&T's appreciating 
value. Again, the Bank refuses to admit that Michaels expertise outshone Weils Fargo's slavish 
adherence to the diversification plan. That the ill-advised move came mere days after Piersol 
prevailed in opposing termination of the Trust merely added insult to injury. 
<j
 P of Petitioner's Memo—Again, the Bank opts for characterization over substance in 
disputing the issue of communication between the parties. Criven Michaels unique knowledge 
of the telecommunications and media industries and the complete absence of comparable 
expertise at the Bank, he should be consulted in advance of investment moves, not merely 
relegated to an observer's position receiving statements and notices well after the tact. 
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1 19 of Petitioner's Memo—Wells Fargo unintentionally underscores the key 
disagreement between the parties when it contends that Michael's "deep-seeded and irreparable 
loss of confidence" is "unjustified/' At some point, the objective facts of a trustee-beneficiary 
relationship rise to a level of distrust and conflict that the law deems intolerable. Wells Fargo 
insists that the proffered recharacterization of its own actions and motives neutralizes any 
perceived conflict. In short, the Bank belittles Michael and insinuates that his perception is 
entirely mistaken. However, the facts documented in Michael's Second Affidavit dispel any 
notion that the difficulties leading to the filing of this petition are nothing more than isolated 
mistaken impressions. 
Disputes With Respect To The Bank's ^Facts'* 
*ffl 1 and 2 of Bank's Memo—The Bank's precise determination regarding its '"fiduciary 
duty" is more accurately reflected in the February 9, 1998 memo of Bank officer Rees Peterson 
outlining his plan to diversify as an "appropriate/prudent investment strategy/' Peterson viewed 
the future appreciation of the TCI shares as unlikely and urged diversification from the one stock. 
Because of Michael's objections, this did not happen at the time. This was most fortunate 
because, from February, 1998 to the present, the TCI stock (now AT&T) kept intact at Michael's 
insistence and contrary to Peterson's recommendation has appreciated from 53,354,208 to 
ST,692,733. See Exhibit F to Second Affidavit. 
The Bank's rationale for diversification seems driven principally by the need to obtain 
money to pay fees to itself and to pay the nominal S416.66 annuity to PiersoL This certainly did 
not warrant a wholesale disposition of 20% of the Trust assets. Further, once the TCI stock 
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became dividend paying AT&T stock in February, 1999, even the need "to generate income" was 
an insufficient excuse. See Wells Fargo's Memo at 7, *l 12. 
A fair interpretation of the Bank's insistence on diversification is a perverse need to 
define and safeguard its perceived "rights" as trustee to act independent of and without regard for 
the wishes of the beneficiary. Rather than pursue a proven course advocated by an informed and 
acquiescent beneficiary, the Bank confines itself to what it characterizes as a "prudent" approach 
apparently as protection against a non-existent threat of liability to Michael. 
«l 3 of Bank's Memo—What the Bank fails to mention is that Michael initiated both the 
meeting referenced and the request to see the diversification plan. Second Affidavit *|*| 1^> 26. 
^ 12 and 13 of Bank's Memo—The important point to note is that, even though "the 
need to generate income for payment of Trust obligations became less crucial" with the 
conversion to AT&T stock (Wells Fargo's memo at 7, <j 12), the Bank pressed forward with its 
"prudent investment policy to diversify the Trust assets" by selling off 10% of the AT&T stock. 
1*1 l-l and 15 of Bank's Memo—It is axiomatic that no one can predict the stock market, 
but some people like beneficiary Michael Kearns have greater knowledge of a particular niche 
relevant to the proposed transaction than inexperienced portfolio managers too caught up in their 
Bank's "rights" as trustee to solicit and accept timely assistance. The Bank's strategy is without 
nuance or insight; it is a classic "by the book" investment strategy aimed more at self-
justification than exploitation ot a unique historical block of media-based equities preserved at 
great expense b> the efforts of the sole ultimate beneficiary. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. WELLS FARGO HAS NO BASIS FOR OPPOSING TERMINATION OF ITS 
TRUSTEESHIP. 
Replacement of a trustee is a matter addressed to the sound discretion for the Court. The 
determination "is rooted in equity " Kerper v. Kemper, 780 P.2d 923, 937 (Wyo. 1989). 
Reviewing courts afford such decisions considerable deference. Id. Only a result reached 
"arbitrarily and capriciously . . . in disregard of the use of sound judgment regarding what is right 
under the circumstances'' will result in error and reversal. Id. 
Michael's petition to terminate the trustee is grounded on some very specific axeas of 
conflict that have arisen unexpectedly by virtue of outside forces operating on this unique Trust. 
First, the settlors of the Trust selected as trustee "Walker Bank & Trust Company," a Utah bank 
with historic ties to the Kearns family. Forty-two years later, Walker Bank is no more. 
Unforeseen by the settlors, three mergers and acquisitions have transformed the trustee from a 
prominent local bank into a mere appendage of a nationwide bank holding company with no 
demonstrable claim on the loyalty of the Trust beneficiaries. 
Second, for the first forty years of its existence, the role of the trustee was custodial. 
Essentially, all that the trustee did was to hold intact a controlling block of Kearns Tribune stock. 
Only in the last two years, with the TCI and AT&T transactions, has the role of the Trustee 
changed. Now, the trustee holds title to extremely valuable publicly trading securities in one of 
the most stable and substantial quasi-utihties in the world. The trustee wants to diversify those 
holdings; the sole remaining beneficiary prefers a course analogous to that charted in the first 
forty years—stability and patience in preserving a large block of communications stock. 
Third, although but an infant when the Trust was formed, Michael has followed what 
appears to be an almost genetic business proclivity into the arena of media and communications. 
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Consequently, he has developed an interest m and knowledge of the subject matter of the Trust 
that necessarily make him something more than a common bystander 
Finally, despite provisions in the Trust declaring it "irrevocable," five of the six ultimate 
beneficiaries combined with an income beneficiarv, Piersol, to terminate the Trust. All that 
remains in the Trust are those assets derived from the block of Kearns Tribune stock that 
Michael, acting in defiance of the rest of his family, fought to keep intact 
The Trust today is simply not the same trust established m 1957 The trustee, the trust 
assets and the beneficiaries, both m numbers and expertise, have changed radically Thus, 
appeals to the settlor's choice of trustee or supposed familianty with the Trust nng hollow m the 
undisputed factual context before this Court What matters is the relationship as it exists today. 
So viewed, there are more than sufficient grounds to appoint a new institution to act as trustee 
In the most simple terms, Wells Fargo is simply fighting for its own prerogatives—its 
%4nght" to act as trustee and obtain the benefits flowing from* that status (i e fees and the 
assurance that its unsecured loan to Michael will be repaid) despite the fact that no one else 
apparently is asking the Court to retain it in this status All Michael asks is for appointment of a 
different institution to fill Wells Fargo's shoes This remedy will hurt no one and will 
undeniably eliminate the hostility and conflict that has ansen from the shifting factual context 
surrounding this Trust 
II. THE COMBINED IMPORT OF THE INDISPITED FACTS M A.NDATES 
REPLACEMENT OF WELLS FARGO ASTRLSTEE. 
A. The Bank Has Wronglv Given Precedence To Its Conception Of 
Diversification Over The Express Wishes Of The Lltimate Beneficiary. 
Micnae! tought to keep the Trust a single asset trust \ et, once the Bank had the TCI 
stock in its hands, it immediatelv began to agitate to diversify thereby generating administrative 
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fees and tax liabilities. Predictably, Michael requested patience consistent with the past course 
that had seen an unprecedented increase in value of the Trust asset through holding the block of 
stock intact. To the extent that the Trust has heeded Michael's voice, the value of the Trust has 
grown, almost exponentially. Time and again, Michael's keener insight into the media business 
proved right in predicting the most beneficial course for the Trust. In contrast, left to its own 
devices, the Bank has sacrificed growth and appreciation for a needless retrenchment which 
Michael as the sole ultimate beneficiary has opposed. Certainly, the 5416.66 annual obligation 
to Piersol does not warrant liquidation of millions of dollars of stable AT&T stock with growth 
potential in exchange for stagnant municipal bonds. As will be seen, the motive for 
diversification necessarily runs deeper. 
One can trace the conflict between Michael and the Bank from late 1997 to the present. It 
is not imaginary. It is not irrational. Its effects are well documented. A knowledgeable and 
aggressive beneficiary seeks to preserve the status quo for long-term growth, while the Bank 
commits itself in writing to the opposite course. Through a series of missteps on the part of the 
Bank and a series of undeniable successes arising from the status quo policy, Michael's 
confidence in the trustee has eroded. The trustee finds it necessary to assert its authority and 
v%rights,, by locking Michael out of any consultative role and proceeding with its policy of 
absolute prudence. See 63 ALR2d Hostility Between Trustee and Beneficiary as Grounds for 
Removal 523, 528 & n.5, 530 & n.15; see also Lister v. Weeks. 46 A 558 (N.J. 1900) (removing 
trustee because, inter aha, friction or hostility between trustee and beneficianes arose "out of the 
misbehavior of the trustee"). 
This real conflict is brought on by the Bank's insistence on undermining the very course 
that the sole remaining ultimate beneficiary sacrificed so much to preserve. That such conflict is 
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unique to the circumstances of this Trust makes it no less understandable and debilitating to the 
administration of the Trust. Perhaps, a substitute trustee would pursue the identical course 
advocated by the Bank; however, the Bank has established a track record that calls into question 
its sincerity in advocating wholesale diversification. 
B. The Jones Waldo Relationship Exacerbates An Already Tense Relationship. 
The best that the Bank can say about Jones Waldo is that the law firm has never 
represented Wells Fargo as trustee for this Trust. Such assurances are little comfort in light of 
the expansive relationship between Jones Waldo and the Bank generally and the Bank's refusal 
to disclose even an outline of that relationship to Michael. (Michael's Second Affidavit *ffl 29-
31-) 
In practical reality, Michael is forced to deal with the trustee on an uneven playing field. 
While Piersol's attorneys are the same folks who daily represent the Bank in numerous other 
contexts, Michael must content himself with counsel who enjoy no such advantage. Perhaps this 
accounts for Wells Fargo's inexplicable anxiety over ''protection of Ms. Piersofs interest" 
despite the fact that the annual sum of S416.66 to which she is entitled is essentially 
inconsequential when viewed in the context of a Trust with nearly S8 million in assets. See 
Wells Fargo's Memo at 11, *f 3. In the end, Jones Waldo's dual representation of Wells Fargo 
and Piersol is not alone determinative, but the relationship viewed in the context of historic 
tensions between Michael and Piersol necessarily weighs in favor of appointing a new trustee.1 
'As stated in Michael's prior memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment, the Bank's 
communications to Michael regarding important e\ents of the Trust has been almost entirely reactive to Michael's 
persistent requests for information, the information is not supplied to Michael unless he asks for it. Moreover, 
Michael has repeatedly requested specific information regarding the Trust and the Bank has promised to supply it. 
After many weeks. howe\er, Michael has not received the requested information. The information relates to: (1) 
fees incurred by the trustee for managing the Trust, (2) communications between the trustee and the law firm 
Callister Nebeker &. McCullough regarding the Trust, and (3) real estate owned by the Trust that apparently derives 
a yearly revenue from mining or mineral rights. (Michael Second Affidavit €| 23.) 
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C. In Making The Unsecured Loan To Michael, The Bank Necessarily 
Compromised Its Ability To Act With Impartiality And For The Sole Best 
Interest Of The Beneficiary. 
Several facts about the S250,000 loan emerge from Michael's Second Affidavit that 
underscore the potential conflict assumed by the Bank when it elected to make the loan. First, 
the loan originated with the very Bank department (Private Client Services) with which Michael 
must deal regarding the Trust. Indeed, Larry Bvwater ("Bywater"), who heads that department 
and who is Michael's primary contact regarding the Trust, personally facilitated the loan 
premised on Michael's status as beneficiary of the Trust. Bradley Wiggins, who has offered his 
testimony regarding the transaction, is Bvwater's subordinate and can testify with knowledge 
only because he was the one who arranged the loan, payment of which was expressly postponed 
until Michael obtained access to his portion of the Trust. (Wiggins Affidavit *{ 7.) 
Second, Bvwater and Wiggins initiated the collection effort against Michael. Though 
Wiggins now characterizes the collection effort as entirely 2 task for the "work-out group," the 
Second Affidavit paints a much different picture. Bvwater and WTiggins took Michael to lunch in 
an effort to obtain assurances regarding repayment of the loan. At the time, they gave Michael 
the understanding that the Bank would not come after him because he was a valued customer. Of 
course, once Michael followed through with his threats to seek a new trustee, collection efforts 
began and Michael now has been sued by the very entity that owes him a fiduciary duty. 
Wiggins' affidavit acknowledges certain anomalies about the loan that heighten the 
Bank's conflict. It is unsecured. (Wiggins affidavit *\ 3.) Repayment of the principal is 
unnecessary until the termination of the Trust (and thus the loan is dependent on the Trust itself). 
(Wiggins affidavit *{ 7.) Wiggins himself initiated the steps to place the loan in collection. 
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(Wiggins affidavit f^ 13.) Indeed, the check to Michael for the loan proceeds was signed by 
Bywater and Wiggins. (Second Affidavit, Exhibit 0.) 
More than any other point raised by Michael, this state of affairs is rife with conflicts for 
the Bank as trustee. The Bank as trustee will disperse Trust income to Michael against which, as 
a judgment creditor, it must seek execution. The Bank as trustee must manage and invest Trust 
assets that, as a creditor of Michael, it views as the sole source for repayment of principal. Cf. 
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research v. Holman, 732 P.2d 974, 986 (Wash, 1987) (removing 
trustee who had charged excessive fees because, by virtue of court order mandating repayment of 
fees, he became both debtor of the trust and creditor as trustee). Also, members of its Private 
Client Services Group, including Michael's principal Trust contact, Bywater, all of whom office 
adjacent to the Trust Department, will be witnesses in any litigation to enforce the loan. 
It is inconceivable that, given this state of affairs, the Bank can remain impartial, 
disinterested and loyal to the interests of the ultimate beneficiary. The diversification program, 
by which the Bank seeks to convert stable but potentially appreciating AT&T stock into bonds, 
obviously benefits the Bank not only from the standpoint of administrative fees but also as a 
means of reducing any risk to the source of recovery on the loan. The Bank may also be tempted 
to place Trust assets in investments that will generate short-term income against which it may 
levy to collect the loan. This conflict destroys any justification for keeping the Bank as trustee. 
D. The Disingenuous Manner In Which The Bank Has Charged The Trust With 
Its Attorney's Fees In This Action Provides Further Evidence Of The Bank's 
Compromised Position. 
The final blow to the Bank's trustee status results from its precipitous assessment of 
attorney's fees against the Trust. In a July 7, 1999 letter, Don Showalter of the Bank's Trust 
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Department attempts to explain why he has charged the Trust $3,046.35 in attorney's fees in the 
June, 1999, statement (Second Affidavit, Exhibit R). He represents as follows: 
[T]he bank in its capacity as trustee hired the firm Callister Nebeker & 
McCullough to represent it in relation to vour efforts to "break" the trust. While 
the bank continues to be a neutral party to this action, it was determined that, as 
trustee, the bank should be aware of the various petitions filed by both parties. 
This firm also was asked to file our objection to your petition to remove the bank 
as trustee. Our only reason for doing so is that we feel we have been acting in a 
prudent manner pursuant to the terms of the trust agreement by which we are 
bound. 
(Emphasis added). In so charging the Trust assets, of which Michael is the sole ultimate 
beneficiary, with the fees of counsel, the Bank abandons neutrality and imposes on Michael an 
additional expense for challenging Piersol. 
Likewise, the Bank penalizes Michael for questioning the propriety of the Bank's 
continuing as trustee. See Dennis v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat 7 Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 901 
(1st Cir. 1984) (holding that the conduct of parties during the course of litigation itself can 
demonstrate hostility sufficient to warrant removal of a trustee). Taken together with the Bank's 
other actions detailed above, in the prior Memorandum in Support of Michael Kearn's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and m Michael's two affidavit, the time is long past that Wells Fargo 
can claim complete loyalty to anyone but itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Viewed in the aggregate, the undisputed facts of the Bank's relationship with Michael 
compel the conclusion that, as a matter of law, this Court should appoint a new trustee not 
burdened with the conflicts of interest and historical missteps that poison the beneficiary/trustee 
relationship in this instance 
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Dated this>#V^ day of August, 1999. 
KERTON & McCONKIE 
:ric C. Olson 
Matthew K. Richards 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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I hereby certify that true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO WELLS FARGO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was 
mailed, postage fully prepaid, this 26th day of August, 1999, to the following: 
George E. Harris, Jr. 
Jennifer Ward 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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ADDENDUM #2 
FILED 
EncC. Olson (#4108) 
Matthew K. Richards (#7972) Q3,VJG25 PM U- 28 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Michael J. Kearns 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROBATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of 
THE THOMAS F. KEARNS, JR. and 
MARY DURKIN KEARNS TRUST, 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS 
Case No. 993900489 TR 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Michael J. Kearns, being first duly sworn, does depose and state as follows: 
1. This Affidavit supplements my earlier affidavit in this action and is a response to the 
affidavits filed by Wells Fargo. I make the following statements based on my personal 
knowledge. 
2. My employment background is in the media business. For more than twenty years, I 
have been a publishing executive including stints with two Fortune 500 companies. During that 
time, I have developed contacts in the communications industry and have closely followed the 
growth of that industry and its investment potential. In the process, I have developed 
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considerable knowledge and expertise in understanding that industry from both an operational 
and investment standpoint. 
Partial Termination of the Trust 
3. Originally, I was one of six ultimate beneficiaries of the subject Trust, the other five 
being my siblings. (As noted in my earlier affidavit, the Trust does provide for a nominal yearly 
annuity to be paid to my mother Mary Piersol ("Piersol") during her lifetime in the amount of 
S416.66.) In the mid-1990's, Piersol and my five siblings negotiated a partial termination of the 
Trust by agreeing that they would split in six equal parts the five-sixths of the Trust to which the 
siblings had a claim upon PiersoFs death. 
4. I dissented from this termination in the belief that the block of Kearns Tnoune 
Corporation stock that was the sole Trust asset was more valuable as a block at that point in time 
than if it were divided up among the beneficiaries. As a consequence, the 1997 court order 
partially terminating the Trust left my one-sixth share intact. * Tarn now the sole beneficiary of 
the corpus of the Trust subject only to my mother's nominal annual stipend. 
5. I have had a keen interest in the handling of the Trust assets for two reasons: first, the 
sizeable block of stock of Kearns Tribune Corporation had great historical and sentimental value 
because my great-grandfather, former U.S. Senator Thomas Kearns, had founded that business 
and, second, I believed based on my knowledge of the communications industry that this block 
of stock had considerable intrinsic value in the emerging consolidation of media outlets. 
6. M\ siblings and Piersol obtained direct control of the siblings' portions of the Trust at 
a time when the total value of the entire Trust stood at about So.3 million. Shortly after the 
partial termination of the Trust in 1997, consistent with my expectations of the market, Tele-
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Communications Inc. ("TCI") purchased Kearns Tribune and the Trust's asset became publicly 
trading stock of much greater value than the previous block of stock. 
7. With the remaining Trust assets now constituting my one-sixth portion of the original 
assets being held primarily for my benefit, I became concerned to ascertain the knowledge and 
abilities of those charged with the management of those assets as trustee and to have a voice in 
that management. 
The Trustee and Its Employees 
8. Originally, Walker Bank was named as the institutional trustee. Walker Bank had 
long-standing connections with the Kearns family through John Fitzpatrick, long-time publisher 
of The Salt Lake Tribune and secretary of Kearns Tribune Corporation, whose brother Joseph 
Fitzpatrick was head of the Walker Bank Trust Department. 
9. Various corporate acquisitions and mergers had transformed the original Walker Bank 
first into First Interstate Bank, then Wells Fargo Bank and finally Norwest Bank doing business 
as Wells Fargo Bank (hereinafter "Wells Fargo" or "the Bank")- None of those presently dealing 
with the Trust assets has more than three years experience with the Trust. 
10. In 1997, shortly before the time that the court partially terminated the Trust, I moved 
back to Utah with my wife. At the time, I contacted Wells Fargo directly to discuss the Trust. 
As already noted, I was particularly concerned to ascertain the experience and ability of those 
who would direct the Trust now that (a) I was the primary beneficiary of what remained in the 
Trust and (b) the Trust asset had become a block of publicly trading TCI stock rather than closely 
held Kearns Tribune stock. 
s 
11. My principal contact at Wells Fargo on Trust issues has been Larry Bywater 
("Bywater"), vice-president and regional manager. Bywater offices at the north end of the 
second floor of the Wells Fargo Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, adjacent to the offices of Don 
Showalter ("Showalter"), John Tingey ("Tingey"), Rees Peterson ("Peterson") and Brad Wiggins 
("Wiggins"), all of whom are his subordinates in the Private Banking Department of Wells Fargo 
with whom I have dealt. 
12. Showalter is a vice-president and trust officer with immediate responsibility for the 
Trust. Tingey is a vice president over investment management and supervises Petersen, an 
assistant vice-president of investment management who has day-to-day responsibility over Trust 
investments. Petersen has been with Wells Fargo only three years and, as I have observed him, 
appears to lack significant experience in investments generally or the communications market in 
particular. 
13. Wiggins holds the same position as Petersen. As*I have detailed below, I dealt with 
Wiggms at Bywater's direction in connection with the unsecured 5250,000 loan mentioned at 
paragraph 10 of my original affidavit. 
Trust Management—Deficiencies and Conflicts 
14. My earliest concern about Wells Fargo relevant to the present action arose when I 
first contacted Tingey and Petersen in October, 1997 regarding the Trust. They then informed 
me of a plan to diversify the Trust assets in the wake of the TCI acquisition of Keams Tribune 
stock and, at my request, showed me a two-page copy of their plan. Thereafter, I wrote to 
Tmgey to discuss my current needs and to request that Wells Fargo not diversify the Trust assets 
at that time. I further noted that Wells Far^o's role had changed from one of mere custodian of 
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the Kearns Tribune stock to one of asset manager. A copy of this October 8, 1997 letter is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
15. My reasoning for opposing diversification was the expectation of the market that TCI 
stock would appreciate and perhaps be the subject of acquisition by a larger entity. 
16. I was sufficiently concerned about the stated intentions of Tingey and Petersen that I 
called Bywater directly in Arizona (before he had formally assumed his position in Salt Lake 
City with Wells Fargo following the First Interstate merger) to voice my opposition to the 
diversification proposed. 
17. My attorney Jerry Mooney also sent a December 24, 1997 letter to Showalter 
confirming my opposition to diversification. A copy of this letter is Exhibit B to this affidavit. 
The Bank did not pursue diversification at that time. 
18. My concern with Wells Fargo increased when I discovered that Tingey and Petersen 
were unaware of a true diversification opportunity to convert tax free 30% of the TCI stock into 
shares of TCI Venture Class A stock. I brought this opportunity to their attention and strongly 
urged them to pursue this conversion, which they did to the great advantage of the Trust. (The 
original TCIVA shares acquired in March, 1998 with an initial value of 51,096,521.75 are now 
shares of AT&T Corp. Liberty Media Group Class A with a value of $2,377,799. See Asset and 
Transaction Statements dated October 31, 199^ at 5 and March 31, 1998 at 3 and Account 
Summary dated June 30, 1999 at 5 attached as Exhibits C, D and E respectively.) 
19. A second problem with Wells Fargo arose in October, 1997, when the Bank sold 700 
shares of TCI stock to pay itself fees for which all of the Kearns siblings were liable, not just me 
or my portion of the Trust assets. This sale is shown on page 5 of the October 31, 1997 
:> 
oo 
Transaction Statement. I contacted Bywater regarding the error of charging my portion of the 
Trust assets with the fees incurred jointly by all present and former beneficiaries. Although it 
initially denied the problem, upon my further investigation and presentation of the facts, Wells 
Fargo eventually acknowledged its error and replaced the 700 shares of TCI stock as reflected in 
the March 31, 1998 statement at page 5. 
20. As noted in my previous affidavit, the TCI stock eventually became AT&T stock 
when AT&T purchased TCI. I had heard rumors of this acquisition and conveyed them to Wells 
Fargo, which had no knowledge of the acquisition. This acquisition led to an even greater 
enhancement of the value of the Trust. All of this was consistent with my directions to the Trust 
and my purposes in resisting termination of the Trust in 1997. The effect on the value of the 
Trust from these decisions is reflected in the summary history attached as Exhibit F hereto. This 
shows an increase in value of the Trust asset since the partial termination of the Trust from 
Sl,053,233 to 57,692,733. 
21. Meanwhile, with the enhancement of the value of my portion of the original Trust 
assets still held intact. I finally undertook to terminate the Trust. My mother refused to agree 
unless I would give her, not just the same dollar amount that she had received from my siblings 
in 1997, but the same percentage share of the Trust assets that by now had appreciated by 
multiples since the partial termination of the Trust. 
22. I declined her offer and sought judicial approval of the termination without her 
consent. Judge Wilkinson finally concluded that, notwithstanding her nominal interest in the 
Trust, my mother as one of the settlors had veto power over any termination of the Trust. 
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23. During the course of the litigation with my mother, Wells Fargo held off in its threats 
to diversify the Trust assets. However, no sooner had Judge Wilkinson ruled than Wells Fargo 
began to proceed with diversification. I urged them to hold the block of stock of AT&T, a blue 
chip company, intact while I attempted to negotiate some resolution with my mother. At the 
time, AT&T was contemplating a 3:2 split of its stock. My February 5, 1999 letter requesting 
further delay in diversification is Exhibit G to this affidavit. 
24. I visited Peterson about ten days before the stock split. He casually mentioned to me 
that, as part of the Bank's initial diversification effort and contrary to my wishes, he had sold 
8,000 shares of AT&T stock at S79 per share. I was astounded that he would sell the stock while 
I was in the midst of negotiations with Piersol, with the stock split impending and with further 
news of certain regulatory matters favorable to AT&T emerging. Thereafter, I noted that, had he 
waited just two days, the price would have risen to S85/share. 
25. I immediately complained to Bywater, who responded: fcl don't understand why the> 
did not wait." He promised to "cancel the buy" and later called me at home to confirm that he 
had stopped the transaction. This was a great relief to me as the transaction would result in a 
S50,000 loss to the Trust not counting capital gains taxes. Notwithstanding his earlier 
assurances, a short time later Bywater called again to apologize but said that "it was too late" so 
the trustee would exercise its "right" to do as it chose with the Trust assets. I expressed my 
concern and frustrations in a letter to Bywater dated March 7, 1999, that is attached as Exhibit H 
hereto. 
26. .Another area of concern over Wells Fargo's management of the Trust arose when I 
requested a cop> of the Bank's plan for diversification of the Trust assets. I was given a two 
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page "computer model" for "blue chip stocks." Out of curiosity, I asked acquaintances at a 
competing bank trust department and a reputable asset manager each to provide such a plan and 
received a sixty-page booklet outlining a host of options suitable to my particular needs as 
primary and ultimate beneficiary. 
27. Another area of concern arose recently when the Bank calculated the amount due to 
me as a quarterly dividend from Trust assets. I sent a letter to Showalter dated April 29, 1999 
noting that the amount proposed by the Bank well exceeded the amount I calculated as due and 
asking the Bank to check its numbers. By letter dated April 30, 1999, the Bank advised me that 
my concerns were well founded and corrected the amount owing. My April 29, 1999 letter to the 
Bank and the Bank's April 30, 1999 letter to me are Exhibits I and J hereto. 
28. A final concern is Wells Fargo's failure to respond to my requests for information 
regarding the Trust. I specifically requested information about (1) fees incurred by the trustee for 
managing the Trust, (2) Trust-related communications between4 the Wells Fargo and the law firm 
Callister Nebeker & McCullough, and (3) real estate owned by the Trust that apparently derives a 
yearly revenue from mining or mineral rights. Wells Fargo promised me it would supply the 
requested information; yet, months later I have still not received it. 
Perceived Conflicts of Interest 
29 In the course of the litigation with Piersol over termination of the Trust, I sought 
information regarding the relationship between Jones, Waldo, Hoibrook & McDonough, counsel 
for Mary Piersol, and the Wells Fargo Trust Department. My initial August 31, 1993 letter to 
By\vater requesting this information is Exhibit K hereto. 
S 
30. This letter was followed by two letters from my litigation counsel all seeking to find 
out what PiersoFs counsel Jones Waldo already knew that being the extent of Jones Waldo's 
representation of the Trust Department. These two letters (dated September 14, 1998 and 
October 2, 1998 respectively) are attached as Exhibits L and N hereto. 
31. Bywater's response to counsel's initial inquiries was evasive and not informative. 
(This response is attached as Exhibit M hereto.) It was clear that, despite its role as trustee, 
Wells Fargo refused to provide specifics to me as a beneficiary of the Trust Department's 
relationship with Jones Waldo in order to resolve my concerns about the trustees' loyalty. 
(Significantly, when Wells Fargo decided to oppose the present petition to change the trustee, it 
took the unusual step of retaining long-time Zions Bank general counsel Callister Nebeker & 
McCullough rather than its own outside counsel Jones Waldo.) 
32. The later refusal by the Bank to sign an affidavit acknowledging my role in guiding 
the Trust after it had signed an opposing affidavit for Piersol demonstrated that the Bank was 
partisan rather than neutral. 
„, .
 fc 32. In opposing my petition to terminate the Trust, Piersol's counsel obtained an 
affidavit from Wells Fargo to support her characterization of the relationship of Wells Fargo to 
the Trust beneficiaries. I was unaware of these dealings between the Trust and Piersol until the 
affidavit was served in the litigation. Then, Wells Fargo refused to sign an affidavit prepared by 
my counsel reflecting the documented fact outlined above that, indeed, I had guided and 
influenced the Trust management's investment decisions since the partial termination. 
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The Loan 
34 My October 8, 1997 letter to Tingey (Exhibit A hereto) referenced my need for 
financing m the amount of 5150,000- 5250,000 for a business venture—the publication of The 
Salt Lake Observer I discussed this topic with Bywater who introduced me to Wiggins, also of 
the Pnvate Banking group, as one who could assist me Wiggins, in turn, made the arrangements 
for the loan 
35 Wiggins and Bywater made it clear that, although the loan would be unsecured, 
because of my interest in the Trust the Bank would work with me and they would make the loan 
happen Indeed, Wiggins and Bywater agreed that I would not be obligated to repay the pnncipal 
of the loan until the Trust was terminated and I obtained access to my portion of the Trust assets 
Moreover, I was able to borrow the sum of 5250,000 from Wells Fargo dealing directly with 
Bywater and Wiggins and no one else Both Bywater and Wiggins signed the cashier's check 
delivered to me for the amount of the loan (A copy of the check is attached as Exlubit O ) 
36 When the Observer venture went sour. Bywater and Wiggins took me to lunch to 
inquire about how the loan would be paid I left the meeting with the understanding that they 
would work with me as a valued trust customer so that the Bank would not come after me for 
repayment of the loan Onlv after I concluded to seek appointment of a new trustee on Apnl 8, 
1999, did collection efforts begin 
3"" On Via) 4, 19()9, the Bank ga\e notice of acceleration ot the credit line and 
demanded pavment [See Exhibit H to Julv 2, 1999 Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment ) On July 7, 19^9,1 was sent a letter bv certified mail from counsel for the 
Bank (Richer, Swan & Overholt, not Jones Waldo) threatening litigation \ copv of this letter is 
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attached hereto as Exhibit P. On August 23, 1999,1 was served with a summons and complaint, 
dated August 9, 1999 and attached hereto as Exhibit Q, whereby the Bank initiated litigation 
against me seeking payment of the entire loan amount, interest, and litigation costs. 
Attorney's Fees 
38. As a final adversarial blow, Wells Fargo has charged the Trust with the fees incurred 
when it elected to oppose my petition to appoint a new trustee. In correspondence to me dated 
July 7, 1999, Showalter falsely claimed that my petition has forced the Bank to hire its present 
counsel ktin relation to [my] efforts to 'break' the trust" and that it was a "neutral party to this 
action." A copy of this letter is Exhibit R to this affidavit. 
39. I believe that the Bank's most recent actions of diversifying the Trust assets, seeking 
collection of the loan and charging the attorney's fees to the Trust on false premises axe in direct 
retaliation for my effort to obtain appointment of a new trustee. 
li^jQ DATED this^ 'Oday of August, 1999. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^£* dav of August. 1999. 
Notary PUD lie 
Residi 
• -^J^U^i 
Mv/6ommission Expires. 
.V SOW aJOtf&O: MKR-Mic^JelKeansAtfidav til *pd 
• y < o T n ^ N . NccaryP jo .c **" 
l / ^ 5 f e $ v GRETSL G.THALLER | 
I f*/ iTi'lSl 60 =di>t South Temoie 3 1600 
\ * l f l £ v * ® /Si SjltLaxeCt'y J fan84iu j 
I V ^ f e 3 f ^ 4 ( ^ A y My Commission expires -
VN—-^Af August 11, 2001 | 
/Public y /? sn / y 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that true and correct copy of the foregoing SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS was mailed, postage fully prepaid, this 26th day of August, 1999, to the 
following: 
George E. Harris, Jr. 
Jennifer Ward 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Andrew H. Stone 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
T x S o - ^ w ^ - g d £ q ^ <^Z Y c ^ XS 
W \80O0\8306^0OO2\MKRMichaelKeamsAffidavit#2 wpd 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THI 
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY. STA 
OF UTAH. 
DEPUTY COURT CLERK 
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ADDENDUM #3 
'MAGED 
Mark S. Swan, =#3873 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 561-4750 
Attomevs for Plaintiff 
FILM DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 23 1999 
DATE 
onarmxA 
1
 \ Deputy Clerk 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
Or JUpGIV.c^Vo 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS. 
Defendant. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990908206 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendant. Michael J. Kearns has failed to plead or otherwise defend in this action and 
default has been entered. 
It is hereby ordered that Plaintiff be awarded Judgment against Defendant Michael J. Kearns 
as follows: 
1. On Count One of Plaintiffs Complaint in the amount of: 
S266.35l.S5 Principal 
as of July 7, 1999, plus interest accruing thereafter in the amount of S59.93150 per day, plus interest 
at rate of S.75°o per annum on attorney's fees and court costs awarded to Plaintiff. 
99_34976 CEC wpd 
P P P ? '} 
1 On Count One of Plaintiff s Complaint, attorney's fees and costs of Court as follows: 
SI 07.00 Accrued Costs to Date of Judgment 
S837.00 Attorney's Fees 
S944.00 TOTAL 
For a total Judgment of: 
5266,351.85 Count One of Plaintiffs Complaint 
S 5,094.18 Interest from July 7, 1999 through September 30, 1999 
S 944.00 Attorney's Fees and Costs 
S272390.03 TOTAL 
with interest accruing thereafter at the rate of S59.93150 per day, together with interest rate of 8.75% 
per annum on attorney's fees and costs awarded to Plaintiff. 
3. Any Judgment ordered herein may be augmented by the amount of reasonable costs 
and attorney's fees expended in collecting or enforcing the judgment by execution or otherwise as 
shall be established by affidavit from Plaintiffs counsel without further notice to Defendant. 
DATED this 23 day of September, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
99_34976 CEC wpd 
ADDENDUM #4 
MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
JEROME H. MOONEY III (2303) 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)364-6500 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL J. KEARNS 
: Civil No. 990908206 
: Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendant Michael J. Kearns ("Mr. Kearns") submits the following Affidavit of 
Michael J. Kearns in Support of His Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Michael J. Kearns, being first duly sworn, states as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Affidavit. 
2. My son was born on August 11,1999. He suffered from severe allergies and 
complications with his digestive system. His condition consumed my thoughts and caused 
a tremendous amount of stress and anxiety on my family. 
3. My wife, Miriam C. Kearns ("Mrs. Kearns"), was served with the Complaint 
in the present case on August 23, 1999. Due to my wife's preoccupation with sustaining 
my son's life, she neglected to bring the Complaint to my attention for several days. 
4. Once Mrs. Kearns alerted me to the Complaint, I failed to file an answer or 
bring it to my attorney's attention due to my own preoccupation with my son's condition. 
5. At the time I received this Complaint, I was engaged in efforts to terminate 
the Kearns Trust at Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"). I was the primary beneficiary 
of this trust, worth approximately $8 million dollars, and assumed that this Complaint was 
Wells Fargo's attempt to retaliate for my efforts to terminate the trust. 
6. Sometime after the Default Judgment was entered against me, and once my 
son's condition had improved, I sought the assistance of an attorney because I believed 
I had counterclaims against Wells Fargo arising from its methods of dispute resolution in 
this particular situation. 
Subscnbed to and sworn to before me on this 27th day of December, 1999. 
JB41FERLJONS 
Notary Pubfic 
State of Utah 
My Comm. Expres May 27,2003 
3M&oaO*ay # 1C0SLCLTT841O1 
'^w, -\'.\;^ 
^ W ^ y ^ ^ W ^ f U V ^ '"f P •»! ~) 
Klotary Public 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Larsen & 
Mooney Law, and that in said capacity caused a true and correct copy of the preceding 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL J. KEARNS to be served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following on December 27, 1999: 
Mark S. Swan 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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MARK A. LARSEN(3727) 
JEROME H. MOONEY III (2303) 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)364-6500 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA. : 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MIRIAM C. KEARNS 
Civil No. 990908206 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendant Michael J. Kearns ("Mr. Kearns") submits the following Affidavit of Miriam 
C Kearns in Support of His Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Miriam C. Kearns, being first duly sworn, states as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Affidavit. 
2. On August 23,1999,1 was served with a Complaint naming my husband, Mr. 
Kearns as the defendant. 
3. At the time I was served with the Complaint against my husband, I had 
recently given birth to our son who suffered from severe allergies as well as complications 
with his digestive system. His condition caused tremendous stress on both myself and my 
husband. 
4. I was preoccupied with sustaining my son's life and neglected to immediately 
give the Complaint to my husband. 
5. I did not read the Complaint and assumed that the basis for the dispute 
stemmed from outstanding parking tickets. 
Dated: December 27, 1999. 
^ ^ ^ 
Miriam C. Kearns 
Subscribed to and sworn to before me on this 27th day of December, 1999. 
A 
Sloieofutah I Notary Public 
rA^rCtrnr7t&pteMay27i>axaf ^ J 
30W.apcxMcy#10DSUCire»TOl 
*9*m^rm ii w m m m mr^F^gp 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Larsen & 
Mooney Law, and that in said capacity caused a true and correct copy of the preceding 
AFFIDAVIT OF MIRIAM C. KEARNS to be served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following on December 27, 1999: 
Mark S. Swan 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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May 10, 1993 
Mr. Abe Gillies 
GILLIES STRANSKY BREMS SMITH, ARCHITECTS 
Walker Center, Suite 900 
175 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: 
SUBJECT: 
SALT PALACE RENOVATION & EXPANSION 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Project No. 9211.00/FiIe 4.6 & B-2.6 
CONSULTANT SERVICES AGREEMENT 
Consultant Architect 
Dear Abe: 
This letter supercedes our previous Consultant Services Agreement letters dated October 6, 1992 and 
February 10, 1993 and proposes to establish in writing, a final agreement between our two firms for the 
provision of professional services in connection with the design and construction of the Salt Lake Convention 
Center Renovation and Expansion, Salt Lake City, Utah (PROJECT). 
As you are aware, our Prime Agreement with Salt Lake County (COUNTY) has been amended subsequent 
to our original Consultant Services Agreement letter. We now wish to establish the final terms and 
condftions of our relationship with your firm based on this amendment and our current understanding of the 
scope and implementation strategy desired by the County. 
A. AGREEMENT 
B. PRIME AGREEMENT 
1. The following terms and conditions shall apply to this Agreement between Thompson, 
Ventulett, Stainback & Associates, Inc., a Georgia corporation and Robert Norman Veale, 
an individual (ARCHITECT), and Gillies Stransky Brems Smith, Architects (CONSULTANT): 
1. The Architect has entered into an Agreement dated May 20, 1992 (PRIME AGREEMENT) 
with the County, including Amendment No. 1 dated December 21, 1992, attached as 
Exhibit "A" and is hereby made a part of this Agreement, which provides for certain 
professional services to be furnished by the Architect in connection with the Salt Palace 
Renovation & Expansion project as described therein. 
2. The term •Architect" when used in this Agreement shall have the same meaning as the 
term "Consultant" when used in the Prime Agreement, each term referring to Thompson, 
• Ventulett, Stainback & Associates, Inc., a Georgia corporation and Robert Norman Veale, 
an indiv: 'ual. 
3. The Consultant agrees to provide complete professional services for their designated 
portion of the Project in the same manner and to the same extent that the Architect is 
bound by the Prime Agreement, (as amended from time to time, with copies to the 
Consultant) attached as Exhibit "A", and shaJI render all other collateral services for their 
designated portion of the Project such as are customary in the industry as may be 
conducive to economy and sound development of the Project 
4. h is agreed in the event the Prime Agreement and this Agreement are found to be in 
conflict, that this Agreement shall govern as it relates to the assigned tasks and its related 
compensation between the Architect and the Consultant and the Prime Agreement shaH 
govern as it relates to the professional services to be provided to the County. 
THOMPSON, VENTULETT, STAINBACK & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
ROBERT NORMAN VEALE, ARCHITECT 
2700 PROMENADE TWO • 1230 PEACHTREE STREET N.L • ATIANTA. CEORC1A 30309-3591 • 404/M«-6600 • FAX 404/BM-&7nn 
PLANNING 
ARCHITECTURE 
INTERIOR DESIGN 
B-2.6 
May 10, 1993 
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1. The Architect and the Consultant understand and fully agree that each individual firm shall 
be fully responsible for obtaining and maintaining Its Corporate and Professional 
Registration in the State of Utah and other legal and professional requirements, in 
accordance with all regulatory statutjs having Jurisdiction. 
2. rt is agreed that this Agreement Is limited by the professional services for the Project as 
set forth in the Prime Agreement (as amended from time to time, with copies to the 
Consultant), attached as Exhibit "A", and shall end when performance of the Prime 
Agreement for the work of the Project has been fully completed; all monies received from 
the County have been distributed; and further all liabilities and expenses incurred on 
behalf of the Project, including Call Back and any and all claims by the County and 
others, have been fully discharged. 
3. All Drawings and Specifications prepared by the Consultant in connection with the 
development and the construction of the Project shall bear the signature and seal of the 
Consultant. 
No drawing or specifications shall be Issued for construction by the Consultant until they 
have been released for construction by the Architect. 
4. The Consultant shall be fully responsible for preparing Its portion of the Architect's Work 
to comply with applicable codes and other governmental requirements using its highest 
degree of care, learning, skill and ability. Further, the Consultant shall be responsible to 
analyze Schematic, Design,Development, and/or other information provided by the 
Architect and to make technical design refinements and documentation of all elements 
for its portion of the Work. The Consultant agrees to prepare Drawings, Specifications 
and other documents for its portion of the Architect's Work In which W designates 
completely, definitely and clearly the methods and materials of construction, and shall 
be fully responsible for the adequacy, completeness and accuracy of the work product 
provided by the Consultant. 
5. The Architect and Consultant hereby designate an individual upon whom the other firm 
can rely for decisions on behalf of each firm, who shall be referred to as the Project 
Representative. The Project Representatives shall be: 
Architect: H. Preston Crum 
Consultant: Abe Gillies 
6. By the execution of this Agreement, each firm contracts to the other that it is possessed 
of that degree of care, learning, skill, and ability which is ordinarily possessed by other 
members of its profession and further contracts that the performance of the duties herein 
set forth it will exercise such degree of care, learning, skill and ability as it is ordinarily 
employed by other professionals under similar conditions and like circumstances and 
shall perform such duties without neglect, and shall not be liable except for failure to 
perform such degree of care, learning, skill and ability. 
7. The Consultant shall for its designated portion of the Project be responsible to the 
Architect and shall perform "Consultant's Designated Services" in the same manner and 
to the same extent that the Architect is bound by the Prime Agreement and In the same 
manner and to the same extent that the Architect Is responsible to ihs County. 
8. Budgetary limitations shall not be a justification for breach of sound principles of Design, 
and further, In the event the Consultant cannot design its portion of the Project within the 
estimated construction contract amount, as established by the County, without 
disregarding sound principles of design, immediate written notice shall be made to the 
Architect 
Mr. Abe Gillies 
Project No. 9211.00/Fiie 4.6 & B-2.6 
May 10, 1993 
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D. PROJECT PUBLICITY 1. The Architect and Consultant will make every effort to secure proper recognition for all 
design disciplines in all Project publicity. On all publicity, the Architect will be Identified 
as the Architect and the Consultant will be Identified as the Consultant Architect, and to 
the maximum extent practical, engineers and other consultants will £e listed immediately 
under or beside the Consultant Architect. 
2. While neither of the parties to this Agreement anticipate that a media release would omit 
the mention of either of the firms, It is recognized that this can happen through no fault 
of either firm, h Is hereby agreed that In the event only one of the parties to this 
Agreement is mentioned in a media release, the firm that is mentioned in the media shall 
attempt to have the release immediately corrected and, In addition, shall provide a written 
explanation to the omitted firm listing corrective measures, all within thirty (30) calendar 
days. 
1. ft is agreed that the Bid/Construction Documents will be subdivided into two separate 
packages, to be competitively bid separately and constructed sequentially by separate 
contractors. The "Demolition" Bid/Construction Package will include the demolition and 
removal of the existing Accord Arena and Convention Hall on the West Temple side of the 
project. The "Convention Center" Bid/Construction Package will include the new general 
construction of the Exhibit Hall spaces, Meeting/Banquet Spaces and associated work 
primarily on the West Temple side of the project 
2. ft is anticipated that the County will authorize a third package. The "South Temple" 
Bid/Construction Package will include the new Meeting Room Spaces which will be 
added and which will span over Second West together with adjacent support/service 
areas. 
P- CONSULT NTS 1. While the consultant has certain obligations for all phases of the Project as further 
DESIGNA' ~D SERVICES described herein, the major work assignments of the Consultant are described as follows: 
- PROGRAMMING AND URBAN DESIGN PHASES 
Minor responsibility limited to "public relations" appearances, attendance at Architect's 
presentations related to the Project that occur in Salt Lake City, gather support data 
as may be required by this phase of work (such as photographic materials, utility 
information and existing conditions information). 
- SCHEMATIC DESIGN PHASE 
Minor responsibility limited to attendance at project meetings in Salt Lake City 
(primarily with but not limited to Consultant and County Meetings) for the purpose 
of assisting the Architect to manage and coordinate with other consultants; gather 
support data as may be required for this phase of work (such as existing conditions 
and preparation of measured drawings of special existing conditions requiring detail 
Information). 
- DESIGN DEVELOPMENT PHASE 
Minor responsibility similar to that described for the Schematic Design Phase with an 
increased responsibility for management and coordination with other Consultants to 
the Architect in Salt Lake City. 
- CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENT PHASE 
Minor responsibility similar to that described for the Schematic Design Phase with 
additional responsibility to assist the Architect with the coordination of the work of the 
consultants in Salt Lake City. 
Major responsibility in submitting documents for approval by appropriate 
governmental agencies In conjunction with the regulatory agencies having jurisdiction 
for this project as well as responsibility for the preparation of the "Front End" Bid 
E. BID/CONSTRUCTION 
PACKAGES 
00204 
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Documents (Genera] Conditions, Instructions to Bidders, Construction Contract and 
Division One "General Requirements" of the Project Specffications). 
Major responsibility, based on the Oamer approved Design Development Documents 
(including the cost estimate) for the preparation of Construction Documents related 
to the Demolition Bid/Construction Package, the Temporary Measures'Bid/Construc-
tlon Package and designated areas/components of the Project including: renovations 
to the existing South Temple portion of the Project (such as adding Meeting Rooms 
in the north lobby and modifying the interior finishes of the existing Meeting 
Rooms/public circulation areas); renovations to the Arts Center front entrance on 
West Temple and renovations to the southwest storage/maintenance areas scheduled 
to remain. (See Exhibit "E" for graphic description of scope.) 
The County has authorized a separate Temporary Measures Bid/Construction 
Package to accelerate certain components of construction ahead cf demolition 
activities. The extra services required by the Consultant will be considered Additional 
Services and compensation will be In accordance with paragraph G-3. 
- BID PHASE 
Major responsibilities to include the coordination, "day-to-day" processing/management 
and professional consultant services of Bid/Negotiation activities from the Consultant's 
office in Salt Lake City. Overview project management and review will be provided by the 
Architect during this phase. 
- CONSTRUCTION ADMINISTRATION PHASE 
Major responsibilities to include the administration of the construction contracts 
including the coordination/day-to-day" management, and processing of Construction 
Administration activities from the Consultant's office in Salt Lake City. Overview 
project management and review will be provided by the Architect during this phase. 
- AS-BUILT PHASE 
Major responsibility for coordinating and gathering necessary "As-Built" information 
from the Contractor and the preparation of the set of "As-Built" Documents. 
2. Basic Service Consultant Architect responsibilities are identified in the following 
Tabulation of Professional Services. 
TABULATION OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
SYMBOLS: V Major Responsibility 
"o" Minor Responsibility 
•-• No Responsibility 
Outline Description of Services per Phase 
- URBAN DESIGN AND PROGRAMMING 
Business Administration 
Overview Project Management 
County Review and Approvals 
I Programming 
Urban Design 
Cost Estimating 
Presentations in Salt Lake 
I Data Gathering 
TEMPORARY MEASURES 
CONSTRUCTION 
Responsibility 
TVS&A GSBS 
Not 
Applicable 
DEMOLITION 
CONSTRUCTION 
Responsibility i 
TVS&A GSBS 
!
 Not | 
Applicable ' 
CONV. CENTER 
CONSTRUCTION 
Responsibility 
TVS&A 
X 
X 
X 
I x 
I x 
X 
X 
| 0 
GSBS 
— 
-
-
— 
— 
-
0 
X 
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Outline Description of Services per Phase 
I - SCHEMATIC DESIGN PHASE 
Business Administration 
Overview Project Management 
Phase Approval by County 
Manage and Coordinate Consultants 
Building Code Information 
Coordination with Regulatory Agencies 
Schematic design studies and solutions 
Sketches and Study Model 
Schematic Design Drawings and Specifications 
Coordination of Engineering Systems 
Cost Estimates 
Presentations in Salt Lake 
Data Gathering 
- DESIGN DEVELOPMENT PHASE 
Business Administration 
Overview Project Management 
Phase Approval by County 
Manage and Coordinate Consultants 
Formulation of Major Systems by Consultants 
(Structural, Mechanical and Electncal Systems) 
Selection of Major Building Materials 
Preparation of Documents 
Drawings 
Specifications 
Perspective sketches or study models 
Reviewing plans with Regulatory Agencies 
Cost Estimate 
Presentations in Salt Lake 
Data Gathering 
I Measured Drawings of Special Existing Conditions 
- CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENT PHASE 
Business Administration 
Overview Project Management 
Phase Approval by County 
Manage and Coordinate Consultants 
Preparation of Documents 
Front End 
(Owner/Contractor Contract, General & Special 
Conditions, Bid Documents, etc) 
Specifications 
Drawings 
Cost Estimate 
Apply for Approvals of Governmental Agencies 
Presentations 
Data Gathering 
Measured Drawings of Special Existing Conditions 
Coordinate independent Testing for County j 
TEMPORARY MEASURES 
CONSTRUCTION 
Responsibility 
\ TVS&A GSBS 
SAME 
SAME 
I 
X 
X 
0 
0 
0 
X 
0 j 
X 
0 
X 
0 
-
0 
~ 
O I 
X 
X 
X 
0 
X 
0 
X 
0 
X 
X 
X 
DEMOLITION 
CONSTRUCTION 
Responsibility 
TVS&A GSBS 
SAME 
| 
SAME 
! 
i 
| X 
' X 
0 
0 
o 
x 
0 
X 
0 
X 
0 
-
0 
— 
0 
x 
X | 
X 
0 
X 
0 
X 
0 
X 
X 
x
 I 
CONV CENTER 
j CONSTRUCTION 
Responsibility 
j TVS&A 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
0 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
0 
-
X 
X 
X 
' X 
0 
X 
X 
X 
0 
X 
0 
-
0 
[ GSBS 
— ' 
— 
0 
0 
0 
0 
— I 
— 
— 
— 
— 
0 
X 
— 
— 
0 
0 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
0 
— 
0 
X 
X 
__ 
0 
0 
0 
X 
0 
0 
0 
X 
0 
X 
X 
x
 I 
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j 
I Outline Description of Services per Phase 
i - BIDDING/NEGOTIATION PHASE 
Business Administration 
Overview Project Management 
County Review and Approvals 
Conferences with Bidders, Consultants 
Advertising for Bids 
Assemblage, Reproduction &. Distribution of Bid Document j 
Drafting of Addenda 
Contractor's Questions, Substitutions 
Analyze Bid j 
Assist County with Award of Construction Contract ' 
I - CONSTRUCTION ADMINISTRATION PHASE ! 
Business Administration 
Overview Project Management 
County Approvals 
Administration oi Construction Contract 
Pre-Construction Conference 
I Construction Administration 
Review/Approve Shop Drawings 
Review/Approve Submittals 
Prepare Architectural Clarification Documentation 
(including Field Sketches, Architect's Supplementary 
Instructions, Construction Change Directives, etc.) 
Manage and Coordinate Consultants 
J Review Substitutions Requests 
Administer Independent Testing Program 
Design Jntent Interpretations including 
Aesthetic Decisions and Color Selection 
Process Change Orders 
I Approve Change Orders 
Process Applications for Payment 
Certify Applications for Payment 
Maintain Logs of CA-related items 
[ Periodic Site Visits & Field Reports 
Process Contractor's Request for Information 
I Substantial Completion Visits & Reports 
Final Completion Visits &. Reports 
Post-Completion "Call Back" 
- AS-BUILT DOCUMENT PHASE 
Assemble As-Built Documentation from Contractor 
Prepare Updated CAD Drawings 
Assemble and Deliver to Owner 
TEMPORARY MEASURES f 
CONSTRUCTION 
Responsibility 
TVS&A j 
X 
X 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
GSBS [ 
-
0 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
| SAME 
! 
SAME 
i i 
DEMOLITION 
CONSTRUCTION { 
Responsibility 
TVS&A 1 
X : 
X 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
GSBS | 
-
0 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
SAME 
I 
SAME 
{ i i i 
DDNV. CENTER) 
CONSTRUCTION } 
Responsibility 
TVS&AJ 
X 
X 
0 
0 
0 
0 ' 
0 
0 
0 
0 
X 
X 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
X 
0 
X 
0 
X 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
GSBS 1 
— 
0 
X 
X 
X 
X 1 
X 
x 
X 
X 
— 
0 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1 x 
X 
0 
X 
| 0 
x 1 
0 
X 
X 
X 
X 
x ! 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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G. COMPENSATION 1. The Consultant shall be compensated for its Basic Services portion of the work for a total 
stipulated lump sum of Four Hundred Seventy-One Thousand, Fifty-Seven Dollars 
($471,057.00) to be earned and invoiced in accordance with the following schedule: 
1) Urban Design i 1,000.00 
2) Programming 5,000.00 
3) Architecture & Engineering 
- Schematic Phase $ 13,952.00 
- Design Development Phase 18,602.00 
- Construction Document Phase 74,409.00 
- Bid Phase 32,554.00 
- Construction Administration Phase 292,986.00 
- As-Built Document 32,554.00 
Subtotal (Architecture &. Engineering Phase) S465.057.00 
TOTAL (Stipulated Lump Sum) $471,057.00 
2. The stipulated lump sum amount for Basic Services Is based on the fixed limit of 
construction cost as set forth In the Prime Agreement and subsequently amended In 
Amendment No. 1. 
Jf subsequent modifications to the fixed limit of construction cost are approved by the 
County or the scope of work set forth in the Consultant's Designated Services is 
modified, the Consultant's stipulated lump sum amount shall be appropriately modified. 
3. The County has authorized a separate Temporary Measures Bid/Construction Package. 
The extra services to accelerate this portion of the work as to be provided by the 
Consultant will be considered Additional Services and the compensation will be $2,500 
to be invoiced in accordance with Exhibit "C". 
4. Additional Service Compensation when approved by the County in writing will be on a 
fee basis agreed upon prior to approval and the Initiation of the work. The Architect has 
no obligation to compensate Additional Services unless written authorization has been 
obtained from all appropriate parties on the Additional Services Authorization Form 
attached as Exhibit "D" and is hereby made a part of this Agreement. 
5. The Consultant shall be compensated for Reimbursable Expenses on an "at-cost" basis 
with no mark-up for those expenses incurred by the Consultant and to the extent as set 
forth in the Prime Agreement (Exhibit "A', Article V.3h) and paid by the County. Original 
supporting documentation for reimbursable expenses must be submitted to the Architect 
with the Consultant's monthly invoice. 
6. Compensation for special reimbursable expenses by and between the Architect and 
Consultant which are not necessarily addressed in the Prime Agreement are clarified 
below: 
- Cost of mylar sheets (30" x 45") for the preparation of Consultant's original drawings, 
costs of computer plotting and other reproduction costs necessary for progress 
printing between the Architect and all other consultants for coordination purposes 
shall be paid by the Consultant. 
- Consultant shall be responsible for preparing and updating Consultant's background 
drawings as needed. The Architect, based on the progress of his work, will furnish 
either blueline prints or computer disks (containing DXF translations from CADVANCE 
Software) of architectural floor plans for the Consultant's use in his preparation of 
backgrounds. Consultant cannot rely solely on computer translations for all 
background updates. 
- Reproduction costs to produce Consultant backgrounds from Architect's original 
drawings fif required) shall be paid by the Consultant. 
Mr. Abe Gillies 
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7. All Invoices (Basic Services, Relmbursables, and Additional Services) shall be submitted 
In the Lump Sum Format attached as Exhibit "BB and is hereby made a part of this 
Agreement and shall be submitted to the Architect on or before the 1Qth day of the 
month. The Architect shall endeavor to prepare each month a composite Invoice and 
mall to the County within 10 working days from the 10th day of the month. 
8. Lump Sum Format invoices which include Additional Services shall be accompanied by 
a detailed breakdown of professional services rendered and this breakdown shall be 
submitted in the Additional Services Invoice Itemization Format attached as Exhibit "C" 
and is hereby made a part of this Agreement. 
9. H is understood and agreed that no payment shall be due to the Consultant until such 
time as the Architect receives like payment from the County for services previously 
rendered and approved. Typically within 14 days from the date of the Architect receives 
payment from the County, like payment of County approved amounts will be mailed to 
the Consultant. 
10. It is understood and agreed that the Consultant may be requested from time to time by 
the County, or other parties, to provide services not described in this Agreement or in the 
Prime Agreement. The Architect is under no obligation to compensate the Consultant for 
any such services unless written authorization has been established as per the 
procedures established in this agreement. 
H. INSURANCE 1. During the life of the Prime Agreement, the Consultant shall provide and maintain in force 
the Insurance coverage and limits as set forth hereinbelow, all in accordance with the 
insurance requirements of the Prime Agreement attached as Exhibit "A". 
2. The required insurance shall be written by a company or companies authorized and 
licensed to do business in the State of Utah. 
3. The Consultant shall furnish a certificate of insurance to the Architect on a form(s) 
standard in the insurance industry providing evidence of the maintenance of said 
insurance and shall provide that insurance evidenced by the certificate(s) will not be 
canceled or reduced except upon thirty (30) days prior written notice. 
4. The minimum coverage and limits of insurance to be carried by the Consultant shall be 
as follows: 
Professional Liability: $1,000,000 Limit (Minimum) 
Maximum of $100,000 Deductible per Occurrence 
Worker's Compensation: Statutory Limits 
General Liability: $1,000,000 Limit (Minimum) 
Automobile Liability: $500,000 Limit (Minimum) 
Excess Liability: $1,000,000 Limit (Minimum) 
I. INDEMNIFICATION Each party to this Agreement hereby agrees to protect, defend, indemnify and hold 
harmless the other (its agents and employees) from and against any and all claims 
(public and private), penalties (contractual or otherwise) and damages arising directly or 
indirectly out of or resulting from any Improper performance caused, or alleged to have 
been caused In whole or in part by any negligent act, error or omission, by the parties 
to this Agreement (its agents and employees) professional services, for its portion of the 
Architect's Work, as further defined herein, in the performance of the obligations under 
the terms and conditions of the Prime Agreement attached as Exhibit "A\ This 
indemnification shall include an obligation of each party for this Agreement to protect the 
other who is found not at fault from any and all costs of defending all rights, dalms, or 
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demands, including attorney's fees and insurance policy deductibles incurred b> the 
other In litigation and settlement of same. 
2. h is agreed as between the parties of this Agreement that in any and all actions against 
the other (its agents and employees), this indemnification obligation shall not be limited 
In any way by any limitation on the amount or type of damages, compensation and/cr 
benefits payable under Workmen's Compensation Acts, or any other employee benef,: 
acts. 
3. It Is agreed as between the parties of this Agreement that in any and all actions, the othe* 
(its agents and employees), hereby agrees to waive all subrogation rights against th? 
party of this Agreement who is found not at fault. 
4. Anything contained in the Prime Agreement and this Agreement to the contrary 
notwithstanding, it is specifically understood that this indemnification paragraph sha i 
survive the execution of this Agreement, the design and construction of the Project anc 
the expiration of the Statute of Limitations for the Project 
J. SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS 1. The Architect and the Consultant respectively, bind themselves, their partners, principal: 
successors, assigns and legal representatives to this Agreement with respect to a 
covenants of this Agreement. Neither professional firm shall assign, sublet or transfer it: 
interest in this Agreement, without the prior written consent of the other. 
K. TERMINATION 1. This Agreement shall automatically terminate, if and when, the Prime Agreemer' 
attached as Exhibit "A" is terminated. The Architect shall promptly notify the Consultar 
of such termination. 
2. It is understood and agreed that this Agreement may be terminated by either profession: 
firm with seven (7) days written notice if other firm fails to perform in accordance with tN 
Terms and Conditions of the Prime Agreement or this Agreement as further describe, 
herein, and further any such termination of this Agreement shall have the prior writte--
approval of the County. 
3. H the Architect is terminated, the Consultant for its completed portions of the Project she 
be compensated according to Terms and Conditions of the Prime Agreement, contingc 
upon receipt of such payment from the County. 
L EXTENT OF AGREEMENT This Agreement represents the entire integrated Agreement between the Architect an 
the Consultant and supercedes all prior negotiations, representations or agreement; 
either written or oral. 
2. This Agreement may be amended only by written instrument signed by both the Architei 
and the Consultant. 
3. This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which shall r 
deemed to be an original, but which together constitute but one and the san 
Agreement. 
M. FULL PERFORMANCE The Architect and the Consultant hereby agree to the full performance of the terms a-
conditions contained herein and in the Prime Agreement. This Agreement is effective :* 
day and year first written above, but actually executed by the Architect and Consuls 
on dates Indicated beside each signature hereinbelow. 
Mr. Abe Gillies May 10, 1993 
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The preceding terms and conditions together with the attached exhibits represents our proposed Agreement; 
however, you wOI note that our Agreement with your firm is subject to review and written approval by the 
County's Project Manager. A copy of this Agreement wOI be forwarded to Sands Brooke, the County's Project 
Manager, for this purpose after it is finalized. We wDi be pleased to discuss any items which may require further 
elaboration or discussion and sincerely look forward to working with you and your company on this prestigious 
project in Salt Lake. 
Please indicate your acceptance of this Agreement by adding your signature below ana returning the original to 
us for our files. 
Sincerely, 
THOMPSON, VENTULETT, STAINBACK & ASSOCIATES, INC./ 
ROBERT NORMAN VEALE, ARCHITECT 
H. Preston Crum, AlA 
Partner 
HPC/jd 
cc: Sands Brooke/County 
Roger Neuenschwander/TVS&A 
Robert Veale/TVS&A 
Foster Lynn/TVS&A 
Attachments: 
Exhibit "A": Prime Agreement (dated May 20, 1992) including 
Amendment No. 1 (dated December 21, 1992) 
Exhibit "BM: Lump Sum Format for Invoices (No Date) 
Exhibit HC: Additional Services Invoices itemization Form (No Date) 
Exhibit HD": Additional Service Authorization Form (No Date) 
Exhibit "Ew: Graphic Description of Scope of Work (dated May 7, 1993) 
Suspense: May 21, 1993 
AGREEMENT 
CONSULTANT 
Gillies Stransky.Brems Smitn Arcnrtecis 
By: 
Title: Date:, 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Prime Agreement (dated May 20,1992) Including 
Amendment No. 1 (dated December 21,1992) 
PREVIOUSLY FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER 
EXHIBIT T3' 
FORMAT FOR INVOICING 
(Lump Sum Fee Basis) 
GILUES STRANSKY BREMS SMITH, ARCHITECTS 
Associated Architect Consultant Services 
Consultant Invoice Number. 
Consultant Invoice Date: 
TVS&Associates Project Number 
Project Title: 
9211.00 
SALT PALACE RENOVATION & EXPANSION 
Salt Lake City, Utah * 
For Professional Services Rendered: 
Fee Basis: 
PHASE 
A. BASIC SERVICES: 
1) Urban Planning 
2) Facilities Programming 
;3) Architecture and Engineering 
a) Schematic Phase 
b) Design Development 
c) Construction Document 
d) Bid/Negotiation 
e) Construction Administration 
f) As-Buiit Documents 
Subtotal (Architecture & Engineei 
TOTAL 
Through (Date) 
Stipulated Lump Sum 
% 
FEE 
ing) 
PART OF FEE 
1,000.00 
5,000.00 
13,952.00 
18,602.00 
74,409.00 
32,554.00 
292,986.00 
32.554.00 
$465,057.00 
$471,057.00 
$384,000.00 
% 
COMP I FEE EARNED 
$ 
$ 
LESS PREV. 
INVOICED 
$ 
$ 
AMOUNT DUE 
THIS INVOICE 
$ 
$ 
B. ADDITIONAL SERVICES: 
1) Previously Billed & Paid 
2) Previously Billed & Unpaid 
3) Current Items (Itemize on Attachment) 
4) Additional Service Total 
C. REIMBURSABLE EXPENSES: 
1) Previously Billed & Paid 
2) Previously Billed & Unpaid 
3) Current Items (Itemize on Attachment) 
D. PROJECT TOTALS: 
00213 
EXHIBIT "C 
FORMAT FOR ADDITIONAL SERVICE INVOICE 
(To be used only as attachment with Lump Sum Format) 
SALT PALACE RENOVATION & EXPANSION 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
TVS&Associates Project No. 9211.00 
Consultant Name GILUES STRANSKY BREMS SMITH ARCHITECTS 
Consultant invoice Number 
Consultant Invoice Date 
For Professional Services Rendered From: 
A. Additional Services Title 
B. Additional Sen/ices Authorization Number (Assigned by TVS&A): 
C. Fee Basis: 
D. Invoice Itemization for Labor Cost (Current): 
Job Category Name Hours Rate Cost 
a. $ 
b. 
c. 
TOTAL THIS INVOICE S 
E. Summary for this Additional Service 
LESS PREV. AMOUNT DUE 
FEE EARNED INVOICED THIS INVOICE 
Previously Billed and Paid 
Previously Billed & Unpaid 
Current Items (Itemized above) 
Additional Service Total 
00214 
EXHIBfT "D" 
ADDITIONAL SERVICE AUTHORIZATION FORM 
TO: Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Associates, Inc. 
Robert Norman Veale, Architect 
Attention: H. Preston Crum 
DATE: 
FROM: GILUES STRANSKY BREMS SMITH ARCHITECTS 
RE: SALT PALACE RENOVATION & EXPANSION 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Project No. 9211.00 
Additional Service Authorization No. 
In accordance with the Architect/Consultant Agreement, written authorization by the Architect is hereby requested 
for performance of the below listed Additional Service. 
Additional Services Title: 
Services to be performed by: , 
Description of Services: 
Guaranteed 
FEE Lump Sum Maximum Estimated Invoiced Amount 
s s $ I 
Estimated percent complete on service: 
Additional Service to be billed to: _ 
(Sub-Project Ni iber) 
Submitted by Authorized by 
Consultant Architect 
Date Date 
00215 
EXHIBIT -E" 
GRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF SCOPE OF WORK 
dated May 7, 1993 
Concourse Level Floor Plan, attached 
Exhibit Hall Level Roor Plan, attached 
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